




**The Africa Pavilion**  
**A summary of African discussions and lessons from the Africa Pavilion,**  
**COP17/MOP7**



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## Abbreviations

ACPC	African Climate Policy Centre
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFF	Africa Forest Forum
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AMCOW	African Ministers' Council on Water
AUC	African Union Commission
AWG-KP	Ad-hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex-I Countries under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CAHOSCC	Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CBFF	Congo Basin Forest Fund
CCAA	Climate Change and Adaptation in Africa
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CIFOR	Centre for International Forestry Research
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIFAC	Central African Forests Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GCAP	Global Climate Adaptation Partnership
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GWP	Global Water Partnership
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HBF	Heinrich Boll Foundation
IAR	International Assessment and Review
ICR	International Consultation and Review
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MOP	Meeting of the Parties (Kyoto Protocol)
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
REC	Regional Economic Community
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Sinks
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SLWM	Sustainable Land and Water Management
UNCBD	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCCD	United Nations Convention on Combating Desertification
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
WFP	World Food Programme
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WRI	World Resources Institute

## **Foreword**

Almost twenty years have passed since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was convened and resulted in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The adoption of UNFCCC marked the time when the international regulatory and collaborative frameworks on climate change started to take shape. The meeting of the Parties to both UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol in Durban, South Africa can therefore be regarded as an historic event, where representatives grappled with historically fundamental issues. These included whether to have a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol and how to deal with issues related to sharing the burden of climate change, in particular the question of dividing it among industrialized countries on the one hand and emerging developing countries on the other. The issues are also of considerable importance to the Member States of the African Union which have started to articulate their common position on climate change and to negotiate with one voice through a streamlined coordination mechanism involving the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the African Ministers Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). It is now widely known that Africa stands to lose the most from a changing climate, which will affect food security, water availability, public health, energy and biodiversity. Such impacts are aggravated by its limited adaptive capacity, which is in turn compounded by its high dependence on climate sensitive economic sectors and its low level of development. The fact that Africa has historically contributed least to the cause of the problem and that nothing it may attempt to do will significantly affect the trajectory of the problem demonstrates the intrinsically unjust nature of the problem. However, African governments know the danger of playing into “the tragedy of the commons” which is the dominant strategy of individual players in similar scenarios. Several African countries are making their best efforts to identify and achieve whatever mitigation opportunities lie within their territory. It is to be hoped that this will cause the big polluters to take similar measures. One of the most important aspects of the problem is that African countries are currently incurring greater costs to adapt to climate change. A lot remains to be done, something that was also emphasized at a number of different events within and outside the Africa Pavilion. The Africa Pavilion marks a shift in the way Africa is conducting itself in international forums such as the United Nations Climate Change Conference. The Africa Pavilion at COP17 gave African countries and institutions an opportunity to showcase their initiatives in the area of climate change. It impressed upon visitors that Africa is not merely presenting itself as a victim but is also proactively working towards minimizing adverse consequences and solving the underlying problems. This report synthesizes the main events that took place within the Africa Pavilion and will be immensely helpful to those who are working in the areas of climate change and development challenges in Africa. In addition to reporting on the events that took place in the Africa Pavilion, it also highlights the main outcomes of the meeting of the Parties to UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. On behalf of the African Union Commission, I would like to commend the Republic of South Africa, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank for their efforts in working together with the African Union Commission to make the Africa Pavilion a success.

Tumusiime Rhoda Peace

**Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture  
African Union Commission**

## **1. Introduction**

The global collaborative and regulatory framework on climate change started to take shape with the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As a framework convention, it did not provide many immediately enforceable obligations. Instead, it determined the objective of the framework it put in place, laid down guiding principles and provided general commitments for all parties and specific commitments for developed countries. In addition, the convention made provision for the institutional infrastructure necessary to the continuing evolution of the international regulatory and collaborative framework. This structure consists of the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Secretariat, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and the Subsidiary Body for Technological and Scientific Advice (SBSTA). Over time, the Parties have reached decisions intended to enhance the effectiveness of global efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Notable results so far include the adoption and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the launch of several series of negotiations since 2005 in two non-permanent subsidiary organs: the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex-I Countries (AWG-KP). Originally, it was planned that negotiations through these platforms would be completed in Copenhagen at COP15. Divisions among negotiating groups and countries, however, prevented the fulfilment of this objective. So negotiations continued. The Cancun Conference (COP16) built upon and strengthened the political agreement reached in Copenhagen. The 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP17) to UNFCCC and the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP7) (hereinafter referred to as the Conference or the Durban Conference) should therefore be seen in this light, as part of the continuing global effort to refine and strengthen the international collaborative and regulatory framework on climate change.

On the occasion of the Durban Conference, the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Republic of South Africa co-facilitated the organization of round table discussions, exhibitions, and side events within a structure referred to here as the Africa Pavilion. This was pursuant to a Decision adopted by the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government in its 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in February 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Generally, it was intended that the various activities organized in the Africa Pavilion would focus on climate change and development in Africa. This report outlines the main activities which took place during the time it operated. Several gaps that require scientific research or policy interventions were identified in the round table discussions and side events; good practices were identified; policy recommendations were made. The purpose of this report is to inform individuals and organizations working in the areas of climate change and development in Africa about the key outcomes of the Africa Pavilion. It will also provide a brief discussion of the main outcomes of the Durban Conference since the Africa Pavilion was held in the context of that event.

### **1.1 Background to the Africa Pavilion**

#### **1.1.1 Organization of the Africa Pavilion**

Following the decision entrusting to the Republic of South Africa the responsibility to host the annual climate conference, the African Union Summit mandated AUC, in collaboration with the Republic of South Africa and AfDB, to organize an African Pavilion (Assembly Dec. 342 (xvi)). Thereafter, AUC, the government of South Africa and AfDB formed a Steering Committee supported by an Advisory Committee, chaired by the AUC Director of Rural Economy and Agriculture; the Steering Committee was in turn supported by three sub-committees: the Technical Sub-Committee chaired by the Coordinator of the African Climate Policy Centre at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ACPC/UNECA); the Media and Communications Sub-



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**“The Africa Pavilion is a partnership between the African Union Commission, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the Government of South Africa. It offers an opportunity to showcase some of the important initiatives and activities in Africa regarding climate change and development by a wide range of actors. This spirit of cooperation will ensure that development and climate change are at the forefront of discussions and negotiations.”**

**Aly Abu-Sabaa, Chair, Climate Change Coordination Committee, African Development Bank**

**“All these activities will mark a significant shift from the way Africa has often participated at different COPs”**

**Youba Sokona, Coordinator, African Climate Policy Centre (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa)**

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**“This pavilion puts up a very powerful case for the continent of Africa. People will come here not just to discuss theories and imagine Africa. They are going to see it in reality. I think this is an absolute innovation we have made. This pavilion represents Africa in its totality. And I think it makes a powerful case to this conference.”**

**President Jacob Zuma, opening the Africa Pavilion**

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Committee chaired by the AUC Director of Information and Communication; and the Logistics Sub-Committee chaired by South Africa.

The objective of the Africa Pavilion was to provide a forum for:

- Discourse and debates that set the context for Africa-relevant climate change issues and themes in the larger framework of sustainable development in Africa;
- African policymakers, practitioners, researchers and community representatives to articulate the gaps and demands for appropriate knowledge, policy directions and actions and technical services, including those for the wider public;
- Knowledge-sharing among decision makers and practitioners, the research community and negotiators;
- Identifying policies, practices and research recommendations for stakeholders; and
- Promoting quality scientific research, field experience and evidence-based policy more extensively.

### **1.1.2 The establishment and operation of the Africa Pavilion**

The Africa Pavilion was a large temporary structure set up across the road from the Durban Convention Centre, where the climate negotiations took place. Negotiators, observers and other participants passed beside the Africa Pavilion on their way to the Convention Centre. It consisted of three halls for side events (Rainforest Room, River Room and Desert Room), several exhibition booths, a common networking area with chairs and tables, a working space fitted with free Internet connection, office space for senior officials of AUC, AfDB and UNECA, a conference room, a meeting room, a press room and, lastly, a simplified representation of the Congo rainforest (complete with animals, waterfall, bird sounds and a forest hut).

The Africa Pavilion was officially opened by three African leaders: President Jacob Zuma (South Africa), President Idriss Deby (Chad) and Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos (Angola). The leaders emphasized the need for Africa’s collective voice to be heard throughout the Durban Conference.

This report attempts to provide a synthesis of the events that took place during this period in the Africa Pavilion. Considering the fact that over forty side events took place, the report can report only on some of the outstanding ones. The list of the side events is provided in Annex A of this report, which also

provides a summary of the main outcomes of the Durban climate conference.<sup>1</sup>

Seven round tables on different themes were held at the Africa Pavilion. In addition to the round tables, temporal and spatial slots were identified for side events held by AUC, AfDB and UNECA. An open call was also made to organizations seeking to use these slots debates and discussions on various aspects of climate change and Africa.

Another important aspect of the Africa Pavilion was the space it provided for exhibitions. Different organizations took advantage of the opportunity to showcase their activities and establish networks. See Annex B for the list of organizations which exhibited in the Pavilion.

The activities of the Africa Pavilion were organized in such a manner that all the discussion, dialogue, debate on various aspects of climate change and Africa in the form of round tables, exhibitions, side events and physical space for networking culminated in Africa Day. On any given day, many African and other representatives and observers could be found in the various spaces in the Africa Pavilion enjoying the catering provided and sharing information and knowledge on topics of key interest to Africa.

## **1.2 Structure of the Report**

The report is structured as follows. The following section reports on the Africa Day event, a high-level panel discussion on the theme of Development First and Climate Finance. Africa Day brought together all the round table themes into a single high level forum for Africa; consequently, the present report has elected to start with Africa Day. Another section highlights aspects of the seven round table discussions on different themes. Given that the Africa Pavilion hosted over forty side events, this report covers only some of them. It is hoped that organizations and individuals working on climate change and development will consult this report with a view to identifying areas where further work, together with their involvement is required.

## **2. Africa Day: Development First and Climate Finance**

### **2.1 Introduction**

The various activities in the Africa Pavilion culminated in the celebration of Africa Day on 8 December 2011. Participants were welcomed by Mr. Jean Ping, Chair of the African Union Commission. Mr. Ping noted: “Africa came to the Durban climate talks in closed ranks. Had we come on an individual country basis, no one would have heard us, and we would have been unable to promote our interests. Africa participates in these discussions speaking with one voice. The result is here: our voice was heard. There will be no winner and loser in this venture. If we win, we win together, if we lose, we lose together”.

In the course of Africa Day, a high-level panel discussion took place on the themes of “Development First and Climate Finance”. The panel consisted of H.E. Mr. Meles Zenawi (Prime Minister, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia), Mr. Jean Ping (Chairman, African Union Commission), Mr. Abdoulaye Jannet (United Nations Under - Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), Mr. Donald Kaberuka (President, African Development Bank), Lord Nicholas Stern (Professor of Economics and Government, LSE), Mr. Kandeh Yumkella (Director-General of UNIDO), Mr. Henri Djombo

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<sup>1</sup> The African Climate Policy Centre is currently finalizing a paper on the outcomes of the Durban Conference. The present summary could be supplemented by reading this paper.

(Minister of Forestry, DRC), and Mr. Trevor Manuel (Co-Chair of the Transitional Committee of the Green Climate Fund).



## 2.2 Regional Priorities

Mr. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and coordinator of the Committee of African Heads of State and Governments on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), gave the opening address. In his speech, Mr. Zenawi praised the regional approach (the African common position on climate change and negotiating with one voice) adopted by African leaders in seeking solutions to climate change challenges. In this connection, he mentioned three regional priority programmes for Africa: protecting the Congo Basin, reviving Lake Chad, and implementing the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel Initiative.



## 2.3 Climate Change in the Context of African Development

The opening address was followed by a keynote speech made by Lord Nicholas Stern, Professor of Economics and Government at the London School of Economics. Lord Stern highlighted the fact that Africa can do things differently using the example of smallholder tea farms in Kenya.<sup>2</sup> He also drew the attention of participants to the fact that Africa was on the cover of the Economist with the title *Africa rising*.<sup>3</sup> Lord Stern then



<sup>2</sup> In using this example Lord Stern was drawing on the insights obtained from a field study that he made in the late 1960s in Kenya where he studied the Kenyan Tea Development Authority and its effort to help smallholders grow, process, and export tea. Tea is normally considered to be an estate crop. However, by providing agricultural extension services and infrastructure, including good roads, the government managed to make the smallholder-based model a success. See Nicholas Stern, *A strategy for development* (World Bank Publications, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> The Economist, 'The hopeful continent: Africa rising' (3 December 2011) <http://www.economist.com/node/21541015>


highlighted the very real challenge of keeping the world below a 2° C temperature rise above pre-industrial levels and observed that the real risk was that climate change might be much greater. He cautioned against seeing adaptation and mitigation as two different things and used the example of irrigation to demonstrate that climate change activities often had both mitigation and adaptation elements. For example, an appropriate activity to improve the operation and quality of irrigation systems would provide both mitigation and adaptation benefits.<sup>4</sup> Lord Stern used the current capital market situation to highlight the fact that capital markets are not particularly good at managing long-term risks. He said that low carbon was risky but was becoming less risky with time; however, high carbon was low risk in the short-term but was becoming more risky over time. Lord Stern underlined the importance of finance in supporting the new industrial revolution that is required. He concluded his speech by saying that we did not need more reports, we needed political will instead.

## **2.4 The Case for Low Carbon Development in Africa**

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi laid out the case for low carbon development in Africa. He pointed out that the prices in some instances already favoured clean energy. Fossil fuels were becoming more expensive and in time African countries would be priced out and hence, Mr. Zenawi argued, it would be in the interest of African countries to pursue low carbon development both in energy and other sectors. As he put it, “Green, sustainable development may be an option for others, but for us, it is the only alternative we have”. He pointed out that it did not make sense to follow high pollution development pathway just because others did.

## **2.5 Climate finance for Africa**

### **2.5.1 Climate finance in the context of an increasingly globalized financial and economic crisis**



Mr. Donald Kaberuka pointed out that there had been a financial and economic crisis and the world needed the type of economic growth that could be provided by Africa. On the issue of finance, he called for a more equitable and just financial support: “It is about ensuring justice...it is not enough to create these international instruments. The access for Africa is not enough, less than 12 per cent. We must ensure that Africans have access that is equitable and just”.

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<sup>4</sup> For similar ideas see, for example, Hanh H. Dang *et al*, “Synergy of adaptation and mitigation strategies in the context of sustainable development: the case of Vietnam” (2003) 3 (supplement) *Climate Policy* S81-S96 (Concluding that “adaptation is not necessarily opposed to mitigation, or a substitute for it, as many adaptation options are also pathways towards effective and long-term mitigation and, in turn, several mitigation options can facilitate planned adaptation as well. If a comprehensive national climate policy could strike a rational balance between mitigation and adaptation instruments that maximises the potential synergies between them, climate policies could become socially and economically efficient and may offer greater opportunities for countries to achieve sustainable development targets despite the large scientific uncertainty. This is especially important given the limited financial and human resources in developing countries”).



### 2.5.2 Sources of climate finance


Mr. Zenawi insisted that finance was an issue of justice. He argued that it would be natural and fair that Africa should be compensated not only for the damage to its economies caused by climate change but also for the mitigation services it was providing. However, the argument that we should foul our environment because others that came before us did so was not just, Zenawi asserted. Instead, the difference in cost should be covered by those that had already polluted because the space to pollute was no longer available for us.



Abdoulie Janneh stated that climate finance should come from innovative sources. He also pointed out that while Africa's contribution to climate change was small it was in everyone's interest to have a low carbon development pathway. Mr. Janneh highlighted the need to focus on innovative sources of finance. Raising money was one thing, ring-fencing it was quite another but, Lord Stern said, the approach used by Ethiopia was the correct one where other sources of finance were leveraged or brought in, for example, from the private sector. He underlined the importance of seeking private sector finance to complement public resources. In this vein, the panel underscored the paramount importance of using public money to leverage investment that was substantially more private in nature. This should also include the wise deployment of revenue from the exploitation of natural resources with which many countries in Africa were well endowed.

Following the Copenhagen Accord in which developed countries made a commitment to provide 30 billion dollars in short-term finance and to mobilize by 2020 USD 100 billion in long-term finance to developing countries, the United Nations Secretary-General established a High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing to report on potential sources of finance. Mr. Trevor Manuel outlined the report on climate finance and expressed agreement with the report's conclusion that raising 100 billion per year by 2020 was challenging but feasible. One way of raising the necessary 100 billion dollars was to impose a small levy on transport and financial transactions. He then went on to discuss the issue of allocation. Mr. Manuel also pointed out that there was a need to strengthen regional economic communities and to promote regional integration.

### 2.5.3 The ethics of the concept that “the polluter pays”



Another issue that was raised was whether polluters could pay to pollute more without also having to reduce their pollution at the same time. The observation was made that industries should also have to clean up their businesses, in addition to buying credits. It was asserted that the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol such as emissions trading and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) should be nothing more than options to supplement domestic mitigation.

## 2.6 Energy and development in Africa

### 2.6.1 Energy in the context of primary production and jobs

Mr. Kandeh Yumkella pointed out that cheap energy sources were required to process primary products and to provide jobs for the youth that were increasingly moving to cities. He took the view that we would only be able to deal with the issue of climate change if we believed it could make us wealthy and better off. Mr. Yumkella also mentioned that Africa had financed the last two waves of industrialization through its slave labour and cheap commodities and that in all probability it would also finance the third wave. He argued that Africa could not keep playing the victim and must be proactively involved in facing the challenges of climate change.



Mr. Henri Djombo highlighted the fact that we could protect forests by ensuring that there was economic growth. It was crucial that this should be financially supported and unless there was growth it was not possible to protect forests and our ecological wealth. He further remarked: “Access to carbon credits is a long, complex and cumbersome process. Africa now needs fair and transparent funding sources”.

### 2.6.2 The role of coal in African development



Mr. Manuel accepted that South Africa’s economy had been premised on coal. He stated that coal was a part of its energy future and that there was no reason not to invest in clean coal research and technology. He also emphasized the need to carry out studies on solar and other forms of energy. He reiterated the need to invest in energy efficiency enhancing activities.

Meles Zenawi supported the coal-powered plants in South Africa because it did not make sense not to use this coal when the country had the resource and also had to ration power. It made perfect sense to exploit petroleum resources, exporting these in many cases, while at the same time investing in renewable resources and low carbon development domestically securing a sustainable energy future.

## **2.7 Climate negotiations and African policies**

### **2.7.1 Divergent negotiations positions between developing countries**



The issue of African positions versus China and India was discussed. Mr. Jean Ping insisted that the fact that Africa was within the developing countries group did not necessarily mean that positions did not vary on different issues. Mr. Ping pointed out that Africa had set an example in terms of negotiating on a common position with united and single voice with encouraging results. He observed that we had noticed that Africa was being taken seriously when it spoke with one voice, which also helped us to engage productively in strategic partnerships, including engaging in building and sustaining alliances.

### **2.7.2 Policies and private sector investment**

It was asserted by both Mr. Zenawi and Lord Stern that clarity and strength of policies were important as this would send a clear signal to the private sector. This could start with the developed world; but developing countries should also come up with clear and predictable policies so as to benefit from upcoming flows of finance.

### **2.7.3 Regional integration**

In conclusion, Mr. Djombo said that unity in diversity was important. Mr. Manuel highlighted the need for a prominent role to be played by the regional economic communities in addressing climate change and development challenges. Mr. Kaberuka pointed out that a decade ago the Economist labelled Africa “the hopeless continent” but that now it was widely acknowledged as the holding the key to the future.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Ping underlined the need to speak with a united voice by declaring, “One Africa, one message”. Mr. Zenawi remarked that we only had one future and that was the green economy. Mr. Janneh underlined the need for national debate and transformative changes across borders. Stern said that we needed to recognize that change was inevitable to survive but that this was also an opportunity; in this process of change adaptation and mitigation should be bundled together, otherwise we would lose some of these opportunities.

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<sup>5</sup> Mr. Kaberuka’s statement was a reference to an article that appeared in *The Economist* three or four days before this event. The article is entitled *Africa’s hopeful economics, The sun shines bright, The continent’s impressive growth looks likely to continue*. The article itself stated that it was regrettable that Africa had been labeled a “hopeless continent”. See this article at <http://www.economist.com/node/21541008>

### 3. Round tables

#### 3.1 Introduction

Seven round tables took place in the Africa Pavilion and addressed different thematic areas:

- **Climate Change and Adaptation in Africa:** Under this theme, discussions were held on costs, priority areas, experiences and challenges of adaptation in Africa.
- **REDD+, Forests and Development in Africa:** Under this theme, discussions were held on the situation and prospects for REDD+ in Africa in terms of contributing to development, attracting climate finance and required institutions and capacities.
- **Climate Change Information and Water Resources in Africa:** Under this theme, discussions were held on key issues concerning climate data, information and water development in Africa.
- **Agriculture and Food Security in Africa:** Under this theme, discussions were held on advances made in Africa in the area of food security and on the climate change challenges to be addressed to ensure future food security and development.
- **Low Carbon Development and Energy Access in Africa:** Under this theme, discussions were held on the current state of energy access in Africa and the future of African low-carbon energy development and wider energy access to energy services.
- **Climate Change Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Reduction:** Under this theme, discussions were held on key issues relating to disaster risk reduction and management and to climate change adaptation in Africa.
- **Climate Finance for Africa:** Under this theme, discussions were held on African experiences with climate finance and development to date and on what Africa sees as the future for development in relation to climate finance, including the Africa Green Fund versus other sources of finance and tax revenues used to invest in climate adaptation, for example.

Round table panellists included ministers, practitioners, researchers, among whom were, for example, experts from governments, international agencies, non-governmental organizations, scientists and the private sector.

#### 3.2 Climate Change and Adaptation in Africa

##### 3.2.1 Background

Africa has contributed the least to the increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and yet it stands to be the most severely affected by its effects. The rise in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases results in average temperature increase in relation to pre-industrial levels, changes in precipitation patterns, increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (such as droughts and floods) and rising sea levels. This has an impact on food production, water supply, public health and ecosystem. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that by 2020 some regions in Africa could see crop yields from rain-fed agriculture decline by as much as 50 per cent and some 75-250 million people could be exposed to water shortages. The economic and human consequences of such impacts are further exacerbated by Africa's low adaptive capacity, which is in turn a result of its low levels of development, widespread poverty, and economic sectors which are climate-sensitive (such as agriculture and animal husbandry). Wealth, technology, education, information, skills, infrastructure, access to resources, and various psychological factors and management capabilities modify adaptive capacity. Adaptation to climate change is much more likely to be sustainable and successful when linked to effective governance systems, civil and political rights and literacy.



Consequently, adaptation in Africa is an imperative, with or without meaningful global mitigation efforts. Major adaptation practices in Africa include diversification of livelihood activities, institutions both formal and informal, adjustments in farming operations, labour markets, migration, seasonal forecasts including decision support systems and dissemination mechanisms. Other adaptation schemes which are being actively investigated include having adequate grain reserves, weather insurance, food price subsidies, and cash transfer. However, adaptation planning and practice in Africa is also fraught with challenges which include limited risk management capacity and a demand for forecasting to support agricultural practices and reduce health risks, as well as preparedness to use biotechnology.

Africa will therefore need substantial technical and financial resources for adaptation to climate change. There are various estimates of the global and regional costs of adaptation. For example, the World Bank estimates that adaptation efforts could cost Africa close to 18 billion dollars annually (at 2005 prices). It must be noted that reported adaptation costs and the costs of damage without adaptation are based on limited studies related to coastal areas, river basins, biophysical and social stresses. But even from such limited studies, it is becoming increasingly clear that the cost of not engaging in adaptation measures is much higher than if adaptation measures are put in place.

The purpose of organizing this round table was to draw attention to Africa's unique vulnerability to climate change, examine the challenges faced by countries across the region in their endeavour towards building the necessary adaptive capacities and explore the available opportunities to pursue climate-resilient development. The round table considered several questions including, but not limited to:

- Which sectors are crucial for climate change adaptation in Africa?
- What are the critical intervention areas for climate change adaptation in Africa?
- What approaches and measures are needed to enhance adaptation in Africa?
- How resilient are current investments in infrastructure, planning and development to climate change?
- What investments will African countries, businesses, farmers and households make in climate resilience?
- How do we leverage adequate finance for adaptation in Africa?

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**“Through its round tables and conferences, its rainforest exhibition, the African Pavilion will bring together our leaders to debate on Africa’s future as well as climate finance. All this is to support our negotiators, to support the African common position and to support our host, the Republic of South Africa as the Chair of COP17.”**

**Abebe Haile Gabriel, Director of Rural Economy and Agriculture, African Union Commission**

### 3.2.2 Panel and moderator

The round table, moderated by Mr. Abebe Haile Gabriel, Director, Rural Economy and Agriculture of the African Union Commission was composed of the following panellists:

- Ms. Fatima Denton, Programme Leader, Climate Change and Adaptation in Africa (CCAA)
- Mr. Saleemul Huq, Senior Fellow, Climate Change Group, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
- Ms. Heather McGray, World Resources Institute (WRI)
- Mr. Tom Downing, President and CEO, Global Climate Adaptation Partnership (GCAP)

- Mr. Richard Muyungi, Assistant Director, Division of Environment, Vice-President's Office, United Republic of Tanzania

### **3.2.3 Why adaptation is essential for Africa**

The case was made for adaptation planning and practice. It was further noted that developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) had been pioneers of adaptation planning. In the past decades, more focus had been put on mitigation measures but there was now a clear trend towards adaptation measures. There were a number of developing countries and LDCs that had formulated and started to implement adaptation measures. Within the framework of UNFCCC, an expert group had been established to provide guidance and advice to LDCs on the preparation and implementation strategy for National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) and lists of priority activities that responded to their urgent and immediate adaptation needs. It was observed that existing NAPAs could be characterized as ranging from medium- to long-term. The problem of finance was identified as a major constraint when it came to the implementation of adaptation plans. Countries were urged to “walk the talk” and implement the plans for which Africa must start using its own funds. It must also encourage the participation of the private sector.

It was further stated that in developing and implementing comprehensive adaptation plans, Africa must move forward and not wait for the developed countries' assistance. In doing so, it must draw lessons from the experiences of other developing regions such as Latin America and Asia. This would lead to south-south collaboration and would help to reduce dependency on rich countries. In this context, it was suggested that the experience of Bangladesh established the need to mobilize various sources of finance, local and international, and the importance of ownership and learning.

### **3.2.4 Key sectors for African adaptation and development**

It was argued that although all sectors were critical to climate change adaptation in Africa, the energy, agriculture and water sectors could be regarded as critical intervention areas for climate change adaptation. Agriculture was identified as the sector most directly affected by climate change and therefore demanding more attention. The case was made for the development and implementation of transboundary adaptation activities. The need for transboundary adaptation activities could be illustrated by taking the case of Africa's water resources. It was estimated that 90 per cent of Africa's surface freshwater resources were located in transboundary lakes and river basins. Considering the effect of climate change on the quality and quantity of Africa's water resources, it was therefore important to promote relevant transboundary adaptation measures.

### **3.2.5 The costs of adaptation**

On the economics of adaptation and measurement of its costs, it was asserted that adaptation must be seen as a development pathway which it was therefore impossible to measure. The real cost was related to creating options. The economic costs of adaptation in Africa were huge but it was necessary to focus on the bigger picture which was to build a better tomorrow today. In this connection, the need for more investment on information, science and research was underlined.

### **3.2.6 The need for climate resilience and process as important as outcome**

The panel also identified the need for transformation in resilience and for real improvements in resilience planning. In this connection, it was also remarked that there was a need to shift from short to longer term planning and strategic planning. This might require reforming the current state of institutional capacity to complement the long term vision of adaptation.

While addressing these needs, countries were urged to be creative and to pay attention to processes. There was a need for an integrated approach where all the stakeholders would have a say as to which way forward was viable and desirable. Communities should be consulted since they possessed valuable indigenous knowledge which had proved useful in adapting to climate changes. In this connection, two kinds of adaptation were identified: planned and autonomous (community level). Adaptation on community level was crucial since help from the central authorities did not always come in time. It was also indicated the question of gender equality must be given consideration as women and children were the most vulnerable members of society.

### **3.3 REDD+, Forests and Development across Africa**

#### **3.3.1 Introduction**

Forests fulfil a number of roles, including providing local and global environmental and climate services. As a result, there are various legal and non-legal international instruments dealing with problems surrounding forestry. They include UNFCCC, the United Nations Convention on Combating Desertification (UNCCD), and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD).

Despite various initiatives emanating from the above international frameworks or others, African forests remain threatened by deforestation. Contracts with commercial lumber and mining companies in forested areas are lucrative and forest-dwelling communities use slash and burn as farming techniques. Other factors identified include land tenure issues and non-existent or weak or unenforced policy frameworks.

UNFCCC has long recognised the role of forests as carbon sinks. It calls on all States Parties to take measures to reduce emissions by sources and *enhance removals by means of carbon sinks*. The Kyoto Protocol also encourages those countries with quantified emissions reductions commitments to enhance the removal capacity of sinks within their territory including forests. In addition, two of the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, Joint Implementation and CDM apply to reforestation and afforestation activities. The idea is to create a market for credits for reduced emissions and carbon sequestered as a result of reforestation and afforestation activities. Therefore, by encouraging the relevant activities, the idea is to restore trees and vegetation to deforested lands. However, the flexibility mechanisms do not provide incentives for maintaining forest resources, much of which exists in developing countries. To remedy this, negotiations were launched to design mechanisms to provide incentives for developing countries to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. In the Bali Action Plan, it was agreed that REDD+ would be one of the elements of the future global legal framework on climate change. The term REDD+ refers to positive incentives and policy measures to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. The idea has been in development since 2005 and involves provision of financial benefits to countries to help them maintain their standing forests and to engage developing countries in the global effort to fight climate change. Different countries are at different stages with respect to this mechanism. The Cancun Agreements in turn call for the implementation of REDD+ programmes in three stages.

Regional economic and trading blocks in Africa are increasingly interested in combating deforestation, given the economic and climatic implications today. Whilst REDD+ could lead to the transfer of billions of dollars from industrialized countries to tropical nations by generating sales of emissions reduction credit, a number of issues regarding its design and implementation have yet to be resolved.

The purpose in organizing this round table was to initiate and advance discussions on the situation and prospects for REDD+ in Africa in terms of contributing to development and attracting investment and in establishing the required institutions and capacities. In the discussion, the following questions, among others, were considered:

- Given the state of implementation, what is REDD+'s potential to improve development, livelihoods, carbon storage and the conservation of forest ecosystem services in Africa?
- What potential does REDD+ hold in terms of being scaled up to support development, given the challenges associated with measurement, reporting and verification, governance, and people's expectations?
- What lessons can we draw from REDD+ pilot projects in Africa, the Amazon and in Asia?
- How can the experience of countries already advanced in the process inform that of other countries?
- What recommendations should be made for forest savannah ecosystems such as in East and West Africa?
- How can the challenges be resolved regarding the knowledge capacities of local communities and management institutions in the REDD+ processes?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various multi-stakeholder platforms in forest governance issues at regional, national and local levels?

### **3.3.2 Panel and moderator**

This round table, moderated by Ms. Mary Robinson, took place on 2 December 2011. The panel consisted of:

- Mr. Raymond Mbitikon, Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC)
- Mr. Richard Eba'a Atyi, Central Africa Coordinator, Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
- Mr. Godwin Kowero, Coordinator, Africa Forest Forum (AFF)
- Mr. Armin Sandhoevel, Allianz Climate Solutions GmbH
- Ms. Clotilde Mollo Ngomba, Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF)

### **3.3.3 Challenges, opportunities and preparedness for REDD+**

The panel looked at the broad experience of meeting the challenges and opportunities of REDD+ in Africa, both for rainforest and dry forest countries. It was noted with concern that currently the focus of international support in readiness and demonstration activities was restricted to only rainforests. This was not in line with important climate and environmental services provided by dry forests.

It was noted that the level of preparedness displayed by the REDD+ projects in the Congo Basin was a positive example, as a project that had moved into the implementation phase, soon after funding was secured.

### **3.3.4 Financing REDD+**

It was noted that there was a desperate need to secure funds to implement REDD+ projects which had been in the readiness stage for some years. The need to secure finance through the private sector was underlined. In this regard, it was pointed that the uncertainties of REDD+ were a concern for investors. Suggestions made included that communities needed to attract investors

through close cooperation with investors, sharing the same self-interests as those investors as well as having an open and transparent perspective. It was also indicated that, as far as securing financing for REDD+ was concerned, Africa was in competition with other continents.

### **3.3.5 Forestry and agriculture in Africa**

The panellists also discussed approaches to combining forestry and agriculture as a way to create double benefits for communities as well as to promote sustainable natural resource management in national development plans. It was noted that the primary driver of deforestation in Africa was agriculture (80 per cent of deforestation and forest degradation was attributed to agriculture) and hence it was important to address this driving factor for REDD+ to be successful. In this regard, a suggestion was made that at least half of REDD+ financial support could be diverted towards minimizing the pressure of agriculture on forestry.

### **3.3.6 Greater role of governments in Africa**

It was noted that, in Africa, many of the forest resources were owned by governments and hence they should be more involved in REDD+. Government ownership did not, however, mean that such forest resources were controlled in an exclusive manner, as suggested by ownership title. In many instances, forests were *de facto* open access resources. There had had been initiatives to decentralize management of forests in several countries. REDD+ might provide incentives for governments to assert their right over relevant resources.

### **3.3.7 REDD+ and communities**

The discussion raised concerns regarding the value of REDD+ to communities given that the benefits from REDD+ initiatives took a long time to be felt and therefore offered few incentives for communities to invest in the initiatives. At the same time, it was noted that community participation needed to be increased for the initiative to succeed. Despite the fact that in legal terms forests were government-owned, different communities relied on such resources for their livelihood. For any intervention to be successful, therefore, it must involve such communities.

## **3.4 Climate Change Information and Water Resources for Africa**

### **3.4.1 Introduction**

Africa is a continent endowed with natural resources such as land, water, biodiversity, minerals and others. These resources have yet to be significantly developed to transform the continent and enhance the overall well-being of the people of Africa. If properly utilized and managed, these resources could contribute to creating resilient systems of agriculture, improving access to safe water and energy, thereby leading to greater industrial development.

Climate variability and change pose serious challenges to sustainable development in Africa. While water has numerous positive roles, still largely undeveloped, the destructive power of the lack of water is visible in many climate-related disasters in Africa. The current drought in the Horn of Africa region and famine crisis in Somalia is yet another reminder of how fluctuations in the climate can destroy lives and livelihoods and shows how Africa is highly vulnerable to future even more severe climate change. The effects of climate variability and change translate into greater impacts on lives, economies and livelihoods through the medium of water than through any other medium. Coping with negative impacts of climate and benefiting from favourable conditions would require implementing adaptation strategies that could reduce the vulnerability to current climate variability while building resilience against risks from climate change. This would involve effective

management of climate risks through implementation of risk reduction strategies within development activities. This is best achieved through mainstreaming climate issues into development planning and practice. Mainstreaming involves the integration of policies and measures that deal with climate issues into development policy, planning and decision-making at all levels.

The fundamental paucity of hydro-meteorological data, analysis, and use hampers the effective planning and management of water resources and disasters in Africa. There is an urgent need to scale up and share information from modern real-time Africa-wide hydro-meteorological networks (using ground-based systems building on growing internet and communication technology or other low-cost telemetry and existing satellite products), forecasting and warning systems that make effective use of modern information and communication technologies and support tools for climate risk management decision to improve water resources and disaster management.

The water sector is strongly influenced by, and sensitive to, changes in climate and prolonged climate variability. Climate change will not have uniform impacts on water issues across the continent. In some parts, its effect will be to aggravate the water stress while in others it will reduce water stress. Changes in run-off and hydrology are strongly associated with climate and the changes in it through complex interactions. For example, owing to a lack of data and information, the interaction between climate change and ground water is not clear; however, there is no doubt that climate change affects the recharge and water balance and is consequently a matter of great concern to Africa as most of the rural water supply is dependent on ground water. One of the major concerns of the water sector in Africa is the limited access to water resulting from insufficient infrastructure to provide reliable supply of water for drinking, agriculture and other uses, combined with limited governance capacity.

Effective management of climate variability and change requires that climate information should be used effectively in planning and that climate risk should be incorporated routinely into development decisions. In order for this to happen in Africa, the National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS) and other climate services providers in the continent must work to strengthen the observational networks, quality control, the management and exchange of data as well as the enhancement of their capacity to produce and deliver the full range of climate services in support of sustainable development in various sectors.

Climate change is a serious threat to Africa; climate data, information, water resources development and management are critical areas that need to be tackled urgently and it is crucial that they are given sufficient attention. The measures could allow Africa's development to leapfrog ahead and create resilience in the continent, owing to the following reasons, among others:

- Science-based reliable climate data and information-sharing through adequate hydro-climate data network analysis is crucial to the understanding of climate phenomena. It is essential to improve the capacities and competencies of National Meteorological and Hydrological Services, national climate training and research institutes, regional climate centres and other climate-related organizations to develop more science based reliable and useful climate information.
- Major climate-related risks and disasters such as drought, flood and storms are the major manifestations of climate variability and climate change. These challenges are transmitted through extremes related to weather, hydrology and the destructive power of water. Effective adaptation mechanisms require investment in improving meteorological prediction capacity and on the ground water control and management measures.

- Underlying sustainable growth is water development, of which Africa has a large untapped potential. Only about 9 per cent of hydropower potential is exploited, only 7 per cent cultivated land is under irrigation and only about 65 per cent of its population has access to safe water. Improving water availability, access and use could transform Africa's development and help to increase the resilience of key sectors such as agriculture, provide ample opportunity to act as a low carbon development pathway through harnessing hydropower and improve health through access to clean water and sanitation.

Against this background, the round table aimed to provide a platform to identify key issues concerning climate data, information and water development for countries across Africa. Focusing on climate science, data and information, the role of water in agricultural transformation, energy generation, health, poverty alleviation and wealth creation, the discussion attempted to respond to the following questions, among others:

- What can national hydrological and meteorological services do to increase the amount and relevance of data and information for researchers, policymakers, farmers, and others?
- How can organizations work together to improve or create reliable early warning systems that are acted upon for the benefit of humanity, the economy and development?
- How can Africa's vast water resources capital be utilized to transform Africa's economy in the energy and agricultural sectors?
- What are the major investment requirements to contain water-related disasters and risks in Africa?
- How can water be brought to centre stage of UNFCCC negotiations and political commitment leading to adaptation, mitigation and development?
- How can the discourse of climate change finance be influenced in order to leverage resources in water investment in Africa?
- What boundary and transboundary policy and institutional interventions enhance adaptation to climate risks in major river basins?

### **3.4.2 Panel and moderator**

The round table was opened by Mr. Richard Masenyani Baloyi, Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, South Africa and moderated by Mr. Arba Diallo, Chair of Global Water Partnership (GWP) West Africa. The panel consisted of:

- Ms. Elena Hanaenkova (Assistant Secretary-General, WMO)
- Mr. Saroj Jha (Global Fund for Disaster Reduction & Recovery, World Bank)
- Mr. Seleshi Bekele (Senior Climate and Water Specialist, UNECA-ACPC)
- Mr. Bai Maas Taal (Executive Secretary, AMCOW)
- Mr. Haresh Bhojwani (International Research Institute for Climate and Society, IRI, Columbia University)
- Ms. Ruth Beukman (Executive Secretary, Global Water Partnership, South Africa).

### **3.4.3 The business case for investing in water across Africa**

It was observed that the investment needs were phenomenal but resources were limited, leading to the need for prioritization. However, the business case for hydro-meteorological services had not been made. Even if the business case was made, since the investment needs were huge, the

question was, where to start? It was suggested that work could start by making sure that the existing elements of information were communicated to the relevant people.

#### **3.4.4 Transnational collaboration**

It was also suggested that countries should work at a regional level rather than alone (i.e., promoting regional partnership) in order to get the best results and that pressure needed to be brought to bear on politicians and decision makers to push the issue of technology even further. A large number of piecemeal investments needed to be coordinated. Regional investments were needed, such as in joint regional modelling and training sessions.

#### **3.4.5 The impact of climate change on water in Africa**

It was pointed out that the effects of climate change were more pronounced through the medium of water; available water resources were variable over time and space. Forty per cent of the population lived in arid and semi-arid areas; 8.3 per cent of the hydropower potential and 18 per cent of the irrigation potential were actually developed. Irrigation contributed only 7 per cent to agricultural production. In the light of these and other facts, a number of adaptation activities were outlined, such as managing and storing rainwater, irrigation development and enhancing land productivity. Storage also required major infrastructure.

#### **3.4.6 The need for a comprehensive programme on water**

The need to push for a comprehensive work programme on water resources was noted and possible ways to do so were suggested in considering the rules and processes for climate negotiations within UNFCCC.

#### **3.4.7 Data and forecasts in the water sector**

On the issue of data and forecasts, it was noted that considerable elements of such information needed to be rescued. A need was identified to study effective ways of communicating and using this information. In this connection, it was also argued that there was a lot of work to be done in transforming information into knowledge. The issue of indigenous or localized knowledge was mentioned and a proposal to identify and strengthen the rich indigenous knowledge base was recommended.

#### **3.4.8 The need for strengthening institutions**

Institutions were identified as critical factors in determining the effectiveness of adaptation measures. Institutions operated at different level and in different sectors. Climate change and water problems were cross-sectoral and multi-layered. Consequently, it was asserted that in working together, cross-sectoral and multilayered engagement was critical.

#### **3.4.9 Key issues for water and climate change in Africa: the “six Is”**

A panellist summarized the discussion as what she termed the “Six Is” of water resources management in a changing climate:

- Integrated approaches;
- Information translated into knowledge;
- Inclusive of marginalized parties;
- Institutions;



- Institutional capacity across sectors and layers; and
- Investment in trying to be more adaptive; and infrastructure in technology and natural resources.

### **3.5 Agriculture and Food Security across Africa**

#### **3.5.1 Introduction**

Agriculture is the main source of income and employment for the majority of Africans, millions of whom directly depend on it for their livelihoods. However, the bulk of African agriculture is traditional and rain-fed and is highly vulnerable to climate induced shocks such as extreme weather events. This is especially true of the dry regions of the continent which are home to over 250 million people. African agriculture in the twenty-first century is facing significant challenges — on the one hand the need to increase production while on the other adapting to climate change and ensuring long-term environmental sustainability. To meet these challenges, African agriculture will need to be transformed and to implement innovative technical, institutional and financial approaches.

Recognizing the strategic importance of agriculture for Africa’s development, in 2003 African Heads of State and Government adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as a framework to accelerate agricultural development and economic transformation in Africa. CAADP seeks greater economic growth through agriculture-led development, aiming to eliminate hunger, reduce poverty and enhance food security and nutrition. This will also reduce dependency on food imports and contribute to increased export earnings. In practice, CAADP is assisting countries towards fundamental reform of their agricultural sector, while adhering to the “Green” principles of Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) pursuing the goal of investing at least 10 per cent of national budgets in the sector. CAADP is one of the regional flagship frameworks in the context of the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development.

Climate models predict that more intense and frequent extreme weather events will have a serious impact on Africa. If the issue is not dealt with, extreme climate events will accelerate land degradation, soil erosion, deforestation, overgrazing, unsustainable utilization practices and the spread of alien invasive species and loss of biodiversity. In addition, extreme weather events could bring a surge of new crop pests and diseases. The next result would be greater variability in yields from year to year with concomitant volatility in food prices, at both local and world levels. This is particularly threatening for countries in Africa that are already in food deficient situations.

The failure of even a single rainy season will cause agricultural failure, thereby reducing food availability at the household level as well as limiting rural employment opportunities, reducing export earnings and necessitating large food imports. In recent years, the largest food crises in Africa that disrupted livelihoods and required large-scale external food aid were attributed fully or partially to extreme weather events. The food crises of 1974, 1984/1985, 1992, 2002 and 2008 that affected the lives and livelihoods of millions of rural households were mainly caused by drought. The current food crisis that is unfolding in the Horn of Africa region is largely attributable to drought. Climate change has huge negative impacts on livestock-based systems. The pastoral systems that occupy the marginal agricultural lands are already facing frequent rainfall shortages, causing lack of pasture and water. Furthermore, there increased heat stress, together with pests and diseases. The current situation in the Horn of Africa is a vivid example of what happens to pastoralist communities during periods of drought.

The challenge consists of determining what needs to happen to ensure that African agriculture, livestock and related land use, forest and water management can deliver increased productivity, reduced emissions, increased sequestration, environmental sustainability, improved health, better livelihoods and food security.

African governments recognize that addressing the impacts of climate change is a development priority. Providing solutions to the challenges posed by climate change will mean dealing with the great diversity in agro-climatic zones, farming systems, socio-economic conditions and varying effects. The round table responded to the following questions, among others:

- What are the agricultural strategies that provide/create appropriate incentive mechanisms to increase productivity and enhance food security?
- What is the role of smallholder farms, pastoral areas and other sectors (including the private sector) in climate change, food security and agriculture agenda?
- What would be the best way to upgrade existing technologies and best practices to enhance farm level resilience and climate agriculture?
- How is Africa placed to generate the requisite quality data and information to support both science and local knowledge for decision-making (including the development of reinforced human capacity in climate change analysis and research) to promote climate-smart agriculture?
- How can different sources of finance and financial architecture be brought together to promote climate-smart agriculture?

### **3.5.2 The panel and moderator**

The round table, moderated by Ms. Angela Hansen (Partner and Director at Agriculture and Food Security Practice, Dalberg), took place on 5 December 2011. The panel consisted of:

- Ms. Tumusiime Rhoda Peace, Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture, African Union Commission
- Ms. Sheila Sisulu, Deputy Executive Director for Hunger Solutions in the Office of the Executive Director of the World Food Programme
- Mr. Josue Dione, Director, Food Security and Sustainable Development Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

### **3.5.3 Framing Africa's agriculture and development**

The panel looked at the strategic importance of agriculture for Africa's development and the vulnerability of agriculture in the context of climate change. Part of the discussion revolved around the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and how climate issues could be expressed within this framework.

### **3.5.4 The role of technology**

The panellists and contributors from the floor stressed that there were many technologies and best practices that enhanced agricultural productivity with potential for upscaling and peer learning. Retaining existing skills and enhancement for new ones required scaling up training programmes.

### **3.5.5 Risk management and coping strategies**

It was noted that farmers had been coping with climate variability by developing traditional methods, which was where research had a role to play in documenting those methods, identifying gaps identified and ascertaining whether improvements could be made by making them more climate-resilient.

Furthermore, the needs to establish appropriate disaster risk management capacity at BOTH the national and regional levels were highlighted.

### **3.5.6 The role of the private sector**

The role of the private sector in investing in agriculture, in addition to other external sources, was also flagged up as a key driver to sustain the flow of finance. The importance of the private sector was also emphasised, playing an important role in providing in an innovative manner the right food at the right time and in the right place to the right people.

### **3.5.7 The role of women**

The central role played by women in small-scale, subsistence and rain-fed agriculture was emphasized, together with the fact that, consequently, any technical and policy intervention must take into consideration the impact it would have on women and ensure that it brought benefits. In this connection, it was noted that 80 per cent of the food consumed was produced by women. A panellist, wishing to put this fact in context, raised a rhetorical question: what if the women were to go on a strike for one season? Any intervention in this regard, the speaker noted, should take into account this often-overlooked fact about the role of women in food production. Who got on the tractor, often regarded as a man's toy? It was asserted that any solutions found could be those that would marginalize the role of women.

### **3.5.8 The role of small scale farmers**

It was noted that small-scale farmers were the central actors. They were the managers of the natural resource base and experiencing the hardships of climate change; hence their knowledge should be taken into account. It was also suggested that the saying "small is beautiful" should be modified to get across the importance of sustainability - small was beautiful so long as it was sustainable. It was also remarked that small-scale farmers were risk averse and that they would not increase production unless they were sure of the benefits.

### **3.5.9 Finance for agriculture and food security**

The issue of finance was a recurrent theme. To put the importance of finance in perspective, it was noted that within the same period of time in which financing for agriculture was reduced by a factor of six, the performance of the sector also went down. It was noted that the commitment by African governments within the CAADP framework to allocate at least 10 per cent of their national budget to the agricultural sector could be affected by the global economic crisis. There were countries which were increasing investment despite the global situation, suggesting that financing did not have to come from outside. The idea that agriculture should be given a funding window in the Green Climate Fund was also raised during the discussion. Responding to an assertion from the panel that in African agriculture adaptation was the priority, a speaker from the floor questioned why, considering the negligible contribution of Africa to the problem, agriculture was being negotiated under the mitigations rather than under the adaptation stream.

### **3.5.10 Foreign direct investment in land in Africa**

Questions on the impacts of foreign acquisition of agricultural lands in Africa on the ability to achieve food security in a future suffering from climate constraints were also raised.

## **3.6 Low Carbon Development and Energy Access for Africa**

### **3.6.1 Introduction**

The transition towards a low carbon development pathway is not a matter of choice, but the only alternative for Africa in view of the fact that fossil fuels are becoming increasingly expensive and given that some of the renewable energy technologies are now cost-competitive. Equally importantly, it is imperative for African countries to move along a development pathway that emphasizes poverty reduction, economic growth and the enhancement of human well-being, while increasing resilience to the physical impacts of climate change. While there are clear benefits to the pursuit of low carbon development policies, considerable creativity is needed to mobilize financial and human resources and build the institutions that can support local and national innovation. In short, Africa needs to play an important role in transforming climate challenges into development opportunities.

To this end, pursuing a low carbon development pathway offers a practical organizational framework for future development planning in Africa. The low carbon development pathway creates an opportunity for African countries to modernize and upgrade their water, energy, urbanization plans, agricultural systems, transport, and other critical infrastructure assets. The African continent does not yet have as great a sunk cost in carbon-intensive infrastructure as other regions and is in a comparatively better position to avoid unsustainable technology ‘lock-ins’. Indeed, African governments and their Regional Economic Communities (RECs) across the continent are currently in a position to take a proactive role in shaping the development of their national infrastructure and services. Furthermore, the co-benefits of low carbon development patterns are potentially significant across Africa, allowing for the necessary interventions to create multiple benefits for local communities, national governments and RECs.

Achieving the twin goals of moving away from carbon-intensive infrastructure and maximizing co-benefits will require providing information to policymakers and influencing decision-making at many levels of society. The success of such an undertaking is predicated on how well existing knowledge is mapped out and how new knowledge is generated for these purposes. The process of reframing the policy agenda to respond to needs and priorities must involve supporting institutions at regional, sub-regional and national levels so as to engage actively with existing mechanisms and to encourage existing institutions to play key roles in framing new instruments for funding and action. Consequently, the importance of putting in place coordination structures to draw together knowledge generation, policy and practice cannot be overstated.

Clearly, the pathway to a low carbon future will be complex. It will require well-coordinated activities in many sectors and at multiple levels in order to initiate viable policy measures that place development at the core of climate action. Sustainable clean energy is a central component in the realization of the low carbon development vision; ensuring access to modern energy services is arguably one of the major challenges the region faces today. With over 580 million people in Africa lacking access to electricity, mostly living in rural areas but increasingly to be found on the fringes of rapidly growing cities, the region is lagging behind in several key social and economic indicators. Given the clear link between development prospects and adequate energy services, Africans must be actively involved in integrating energy concerns into wider development goals that include

sustainable wealth creation, empowerment of vulnerable groups and raising the productivity of their communities.

While the energy dilemma for Africa is a cause for concern, there are also reasons to be optimistic, including:

- Africa is well endowed with a variety of non-renewable and renewable energy resources. These include crude oil, natural gas, coal, hydroelectricity, geothermal, biomass, solar and wind power.
- Energy sector reforms at the country level: a number of countries in Africa have undertaken a range of reforms in the energy sector, the most significant being the formulation of more comprehensive energy policies and the incorporation of the private sector's role in the national development agenda. However, implementation of these reforms has faced some serious challenges as a result of inappropriate design, lack of implementation capacity and financial resources.
- Enhanced regional and continental level coordination in energy-related initiatives: African countries have shown interest in jointly developing infrastructure, especially for electricity generation to meet the medium-term energy demand in the region.
- New climate-related financing opportunities for the energy sector: Africa has been struggling to secure its fair share of climate finance, as new facilities are being established to help developing countries adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change.
- New players in the energy sector: capital flows to Africa from emerging financiers such as Brazil, China, the Gulf States and India have increased substantially in the last few years, amounting to over 1 billion dollars annually for sub-Saharan Africa. These flows tend to focus on large-scale power generation, including hydropower.

The round table provided a platform to identify key issues concerning low carbon development for countries across Africa. It also offered a focused discussion on energy access and poverty alleviation, energy sources and technologies, as well as region-specific sectoral challenges (such as transport and agriculture). The panel responded to the following questions, which included:

- What are the main challenges for planning a low carbon development strategy?
- What are the key research issues (areas) associated with low carbon development in Africa?
- To achieve low carbon development, what balance is required between low carbon energy sources, other energy sources and the conservation of carbon in forests and land cover, soils and coastal zones?
- What are the key barriers to widening energy access in Africa? Why have most previous energy access programmes failed to achieve their stated goals?
- What affordable and reliable energy options are there for Africa's rural and urban populations?
- What is the role of national targets with regard to universal energy access, especially in the context of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Plans that countries are working on?
- What role can private sector entrepreneurs and financiers play in increasing access, and how can they be encouraged to invest?
- What are the technical and financial incentives required to shift to a low carbon pathway while increasing access?

### **3.6.2 The panel and moderator**

The round table, moderated by Mr. Daniel Makokera (Director, Pamuzinda Productions Ltd, South Africa) took place on 6 December 2011. It was opened by H.E. Salvador Namburete, Minister of Energy of Mozambique. The panel consisted of:

- Ms. Hela Cheikhroudou, Director of Energy, Environment and Climate Change, AfDB
- Mr. Felix Dayo, President and CEO, Triple E Systems Inc
- Mr. Arvinn Gadgil, Junior Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
- Mr. Gosaye Mengiste, Ministry of Water and Energy, Ethiopia
- Mr. Yacob Mulugetta, African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC)
- Mr. Diego Masera, Head of the Renewable and Rural Energy Unit, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

### **3.6.3 Energy access as a critical development concern**

Most of the panellists expressed their concern that the problem of energy access had become a perennial African problem. The region continued to have the lowest electrification rate of all the regions at less than 30 per cent of households, a situation which was set to continue, especially since the annual rate of new connections in Africa was not keeping pace with the creation of new households as a result of population growth. Moreover, reliance on traditional biomass at the household level was prevalent in many African countries, in both rural and urban areas, which threatened ecosystems and created further challenges to the development aspirations of countries. The panel agreed that the most immediate energy priority for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa was to expand access to help meet their social and economic development objectives.

### **3.6.4 Energy resources and development**

The panellists highlighted the fact that Africa was endowed with vast natural resources such as hydropower, geothermal, wind, solar, tidal, and bioenergy resources. These resources remained unevenly spread in terms of their regional distribution, which might engender constraints but also opportunities from the standpoint of regional integration. In other words, with appropriate planning, coordination and investment, energy could serve as a catalyst for regional cooperation and development. However, there remained some constraints. Africa was unable to capitalize on harnessing its vast natural resources largely for reasons of lack of finance and access to technology. The panellists reiterated that energy was important and a key engine of economic growth and so energy policies should embrace sustainable development.

### **3.6.5 Access to finance**

The panellists, especially the speaker from AfDB, emphasized that finance was a critical factor in ensuring the successful achievement of energy access goals. Furthermore, having a wealth of energy resources did not necessarily translate into concrete results if people were unable to afford energy services and the situation in Africa was that people were income poor. In addition, the investment environment across much of Africa remained below global standards and investors were not attracted to Africa in view of the fact that investing in Africa was widely regarded as risky. Whether this was real or perceived, governments would need to provide incentives that would give investors confidence. A number of countries that had already put in place the appropriate regulatory and incentive mechanisms and had also built appropriate financing architecture were seeing the benefits of scaled-up investments in renewable energy. The example of AfDB's financing for renewable energy of nearly 500 million dollars was cited as a good illustration of a positive outcome when investors' willingness and market readiness were combined. The panellists also

warned that such efforts should be designed to respond to people's needs and that therefore resources should be mobilised in a transparent manner.

### **3.6.6 Energy and the productive sector**

Two panellists made the point that the productive sector or energy for productivity should play the driving role in widening access to energy services. One panellist pointed out that no country had achieved universal access to energy without effectively addressing the energy issues in the productive sector, which had indirectly contributed to enhancing access at the household level. This meant that the "energy access" debate should be framed in a broader and system-wide agenda for transformation and not just be focused on household level energy challenges as was often the case. In this regard, each country needed to chart its own energy transition pathway into the future; there were ample examples of previous energy transitions from which to learn. A number of the panellists also pointed to the need for diversifying the energy mix, including the deployment of centralised and decentralised systems, as deemed appropriate.

### **3.6.7 Finance and donor behaviour**

One panellist argued that there was a proliferation of donors emerging with considerable resources to support energy access in Africa. While this was good news, there was a need for harmonization of these activities. Furthermore, it was important to make sure that the benefits were appropriately distributed between investors and recipients; donors could play a pivotal role in protecting the latter. For example, Norway had a strict policy on investors that after a given period (fifty years) control was to be transferred to state institutions. The panellist made the point that this model could offer some useful lessons for Africa to avoid potential exploitation.

### **3.6.8 Low carbon development pathways for Africa**

All panellists agreed that Africa had a unique opportunity to grow in a low carbon pathway, but would need to invest in new technologies and attract both external and internally generated funding. Low carbon technologies required large upfront investment, and Africa needed to create the investment environment for such high risk investments. To do this, African countries needed the partnership of developed countries to put in place effective policies on investors to ensure that the interests of local communities were protected.

It was also important that low carbon development should adopt a cross-sectoral character in that it increased the resources efficiency of inter-sectoral links.

## **3.7 Climate Change Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Management**

### **3.7.1 Introduction**

Disaster vulnerabilities and exposure in Africa are increasing, compounding the challenges of sustainable development and undermining Africa's prospect of achieving the Millennium Development Goals. On average, almost two disasters of significant proportions have been recorded every week in the region since 2000. Climatic and hydrological hazards, in particular drought, floods and cyclones, dominate the disaster profile of the Africa region, affecting, on average, around 12.5 million people per year.

Member States of the African Union have demonstrated continued commitment to disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the adoption of the Decision on the Report of the Second African Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction by the Executive Council of the African Union

at the January 2011 Summit. The Executive Council endorsed the recommendations contained in the Ministerial Declaration as well as the Extended Africa Programme of Action (PoA) for DRR 2005-2012, which includes strategic areas of intervention, key activities, expected outcomes, measurable indicators and mechanisms at regional, sub-regional and national level to coordinate and support implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and its Programme of Action 2005-2015, which is in line with the global Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. One overall goal highlighted in the PoA was to mainstream risk reduction management and climate change adaptation as an integral part of sustainable development.

At subregional level, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are being duly empowered to provide effective coordination and strategic guidance to their respective Member States to align their subregional strategies and programmes to the Africa Regional Strategy and Programme of Action and facilitate their effective implementation in their subregions.

During 2011, the Africa Working Group on DRR (AWG) was inaugurated by the African Union Commission (AUC) as an Africa-driven mechanism to provide coordination and technical support to AUC, RECs, Member States and partners for the implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for DRR and its Programme of Action. The AWG is chaired by the AUC in partnership, with UNISDR acting as a Secretariat.

In Africa, a level of commitment exists in the enactment of DRR legislation with a positive trend in the establishment or reform of institutional, legislative and policy frameworks for DRR. Currently, 34 African countries have established national platforms or the equivalent, 25 countries have national policies and strategies for disaster risk reduction and 13 countries have allocated resources for DRR from the national budget, according to the UNISDR regional office for Africa that monitors the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and its Programme of Action.

In Africa, there is also a greater recognition of the relationship between poverty and vulnerability to disasters caused by natural hazards. As a result, many countries have put in place mechanisms to protect the environment and ensure sustainable development; 29 countries are making significant efforts for the inclusion of DRR in their national plans for climate change adaptation (NAPAs).

The Cancun Adaptation Framework agreed in Mexico called on Parties to strengthen adaptation action in nine areas, including “enhancing climate change-related disaster risk reduction strategies, taking into consideration the Hyogo Framework for Action; early warning systems; risk assessment and management; and sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance, at local, national, subregional and regional levels, as appropriate”.

The Durban Conference provided a key opportunity to focus on disaster risk reduction and management and climate change adaptation, especially in Africa. While many organizations are working to improve early warning systems and contingency planning, a gap still exists at the institutional level as the affected populations are still insufficiently prepared to cope with disasters and to adapt to change.

The objective of the round table was to highlight the importance of disaster risk reduction and management as a tool to reduce vulnerability and enhance coping capacities to climate change impacts and related cooperation and synergies. The panel responded to the following questions, including:



- What evidence and experience from the African continent exist that can highlight the effectiveness of disaster risk reduction in the context of dealing with climate change and contributing to resilience and sustainable development for the most vulnerable?
- How can access to information about risk, vulnerability and exposure be strengthened and contribute to decision-making as well as planning processes at regional, national and local level?
- What financial resources are required to scale up climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction and how can it be ensured that they reduce risks in a systematic manner?
- What are the key priorities for Africa and its countries to effectively reduce risk, ensure food security, build resilience and enhance coping capacities in the next decade?

### **3.7.2 The panel and moderator**

The panel, moderated by Ms. Rhoda Peace (Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture, African Union) consisted of:

- Ms. Margareta Wahlstrom, (UN Assistant Secretary-General for UNISDR)
- Mr. Denis McClean, Head of Communications and Outreach, UNISDR
- Mr. Rajendra K. Pachauri, Chair, IPCC
- Mr. Abdou Sane, President of Parliamentarian Network on DRR, Member of Parliament in Senegal and DRR Champion in Africa
- Mr. Manboub Maalim, Executive Secretary, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- Mr. Jato Sillah, Minister of Forestry and the Environment, Republic of The Gambia
- Mr. Ken Johm, African Development Bank
- Ms. Sheila Sisulu, Deputy Executive Director, WFP
- Mr. Fillipe Domingos Freires Lucio, Global Framework for Climate Services Office, World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
- Ms. Renate Christ, IPCC.

### **3.7.3 A continent most prone to disasters**

African countries were highlighted as being amongst the most disaster-prone in the world. Statistics showed that two of the most damaging disasters in Africa were droughts and floods, responsible for 79 per cent and 18 per cent losses in GDP respectively. Disaster was identified at the session as one of the main inhibitors of development in many African countries, climate change being identified only as a subset of the global sustainability crisis. In exemplifying this point, statistics showed that disasters contributed to between 3 and 15 per cent of annual loss in GDP in African countries.

### **3.7.4 Challenges of disaster risk management**

Challenges identified in disaster management included access to usable information in order to inform policy and strategy development and re-structuring of governmental and non-governmental institutions in order to deal with this threat across the sectors of governance and society. Suggested solutions to these challenges were the creation of increased databases on a regional and national level; increasing awareness of disaster management via the various forms of media and non-governmental advocacy, as well as active interaction with the African Development Bank and related organizations in order to form and implement effective programmes to rebuild infrastructure.

Other strategies included the creation of more disaster-resilient environments via the use of national and regional environments that have been developed. These included flood coping strategies developed and implemented in countries such as Mozambique.

### **3.7.5 Role of the African Development Bank**

It was reported that the African Development Bank had developed procedures for disaster stricken countries to apply for aid. This aid came in the form of emergency relief and adaptability and assistance programmes, the latter being for long-term issues related to the impacts of disaster.

### **3.7.6 Role of the private sector**

It was pointed out that further measures needed to be developed to mobilize the private sector to assist in the fight against climate, as well as increasing mechanisms to ensure that financial relief reached the rural communities most affected.

## **3.8 Climate Finance for Africa**

### **3.8.1 Introduction**

The social, economic and political impacts of climate change are already being felt by many countries in Africa, with increasing evidence that climate change is directly affecting economic growth and development. African countries will require significant resources to be able to develop in a way that reduces carbon emissions and increases the resilience of their environment and economy. Moreover, they need to be equipped to put in place the institutions, knowledge, and policy frameworks necessary for making informed policy decisions and taking steps to catalyze finance and promote low-carbon, climate-resilient development.

The Cancun Agreement notes that, “addressing climate change requires a paradigm shift towards building a low carbon society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures continued high growth and sustainable development”. The agreement consists of a set of decisions that anchor national mitigation pledges and take some important steps to strengthen finance, transparency in emissions reporting by all countries and other elements of the multilateral climate framework. One element of the agreement formalized the finance goals set in Copenhagen to mobilize fast-start and long-term climate finance. In this context, a collective commitment was made by developed countries “to provide new and additional resources through international institutions, approaching 30 billion dollars in fast-start finance for the period 2010-2012”. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, which includes LDCs, Small Island Developing States and countries in Africa.

The current UNFCCC funding is generally reported to be far inferior to the actual needs of Africa and criticized as relying mainly on voluntary contributions. While additional adaptation costs for Africa by 2015 are estimated by Vivid Economics at between 20 and 30 billion dollars, the Climate Funds Update Website records that only 154 million dollars are implemented within Africa through dedicated bilateral and multilateral climate funds. This reflects the large gap between the climate funds required and made available for Africa and the challenging task required for up-scaling the funds to match the continent’s needs.

Despite the proliferation of climate finance instruments, Africa’s access to these mechanisms remains dramatically low, in comparison with other developing regions. Limited access to existing funds is due to a number of constraints including low capacities to meet international standards and Funds’ eligibility requirements related to preparing project concept

notes and full proposals; lack of governance and coordination among relevant agencies to leverage existing climate change resource; lack of appropriate regulatory reforms and policies and related national development plans and prioritization of investment and limited absorptive capacities for timely implementation. In addition, the fragmentation of existing funding instruments further aggravates the situation. While key sectors such as agriculture, water and energy receive some domestic and donor development financing support, the lack of support explicitly devoted to climate change undermines the efforts required to deliver concrete actions.

Africa needs large financial resources and technical capacities to drive adaptation and mitigation efforts. The World Bank estimates that annual appending of 93 billion dollars would be required to improve Africa's infrastructure. Of that amount, almost half is to boost the continent's power supply. It is worth making the point that if climate finance for mitigation were to focus mainly on the small number of developing countries that are the largest emitters — as the Clean Technology Fund has done — this would leave many countries with very limited financial assistance.

Clearly, the financing of climate mitigation and adaptation in developing countries represents a major challenge to the successful outcome of COP17. The effective mobilization of financial resources is regarded by many as a key area in the negotiations to support large-scale investments in energy and other key infrastructures to meet both development and climate objectives in Africa. Leveraging climate finance will bring a number of concomitant benefits:

- Financing climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts can simultaneously address poverty reduction and sustainable development concerns in Africa. For example, sufficient hydropower potential exists in Africa to provide twice the continent's energy access needs, offering the potential to provide electricity to Africa's citizens and industries and doing so in a climate friendly way.
- Allocating additional financial resources to Africa will assist the continent to address its adaptation needs by building capacity and skills, apply technologies and promote long-term investments in natural resource development, including energy and forests.
- Climate finance can be a catalyst to leverage private and public resources, open up new economic opportunities, promote technology deployment and transform development pathways. One potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing is the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF), currently under negotiation by Parties to the convention.
- The African Development Bank is proposing the establishment of the Africa Green Fund (AGF) whose purpose would be to receive and manage resources allocated to Africa from all sources, including the fast track financing and long-term pledges made under the Copenhagen Accord and the Green Climate Fund. AGF is expected to help finance projects and programmes that contribute to low carbon and climate resilient development in Africa.

Discussions looked at the various sources and disbursement levels of climate finance, and the potential benefits to and limitations of development in Africa. The panel wanted to see increased awareness on issues of climate change finance and greater understanding of the fact that African countries needed to increase their access to global climate change financing mechanisms in order to mainstream climate change effectively into their development frameworks. Discussions also looked more closely at the potential for using climate finance to stimulate and generate domestic resources for climate action — seen by some as a fundamental step in moving towards a positive and nationally owned sustainable development pathway. The panel responded to the following questions, including:

- Why has the disbursement of ‘fast-start’ finance been slow?
- What lessons can we draw from the experience of fast-start finance for as we move towards long-term finance?
- How can Africa’s accessibility to climate funds be increased?
- How much additional finance is needed by Africa to address adaptation and mitigation in a balanced way?
- What are the potential sources for money and how will the finance be raised to meet these requirements? How can issues of equity and regional balances be dealt with during the funds transfer and in the process of division between diverse recipients in developing countries?
- How can we ensure that public climate finance will be used to mobilize substantial private financing?

### **3.8.2 The panel and moderator**

The panel consisted of:

- Mr. Daniel Mekokera, CEO, Pamuzinda Productions
- Mr. Jean Ping, Chair, African Union Commission
- Mr. Donald Kaberuka, President, African Development Bank
- Mr. Abdulie Janneh, Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
- Mr. Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance, Republic of South Africa
- Mr. Henri Djombo, Minister of Forestry, Environment and Sustainable Development, Republic of Congo
- Ms. Barbara Buchner, Climate Policy Initiative
- Mr. Benito Mueller, Director, Oxford Climate Policy, University of Oxford.

### **3.8.3 Climate finance and adaptation**

The panellists highlighted the fact that climate change adaptation and mitigation in Africa would require considerable finance, much of which would need to be obtained externally. This was critical to advancing the mission for sustainable development.

### **3.8.4 Limited climate finance to date for Africa**

It was emphasized that so far Africa had attracted little climate finance, largely because of its low greenhouse gas emissions and because many of the existing instruments tended to target investments for emissions abatement instead of avoiding emission opportunities.

### **3.8.5 The Africa Green Fund and the Green Climate Fund**

The establishment of the Africa Green Fund was seen by some as one avenue that could be used to mobilize sustainable finance for climate interventions. However, the global financial crisis and economic challenges being faced in Europe and North America were likely to limit the fulfilment of the ambition to secure funding for the Green Climate Fund or the Africa Green Fund.

There was also a strong view expressed that consideration should be given to different models for utilizing the Green Climate Fund. One view was that the Fund should involve a fundamental devolution of decision-making to National Funding Entities, that is, to house funds in recipient countries rather than in donor agencies or multilateral funds.

### **3.8.6 Revenue to support global climate finance**

The suggestion made to explore the potential for providing climate finance from carbon-related charges levied on international aviation and maritime transport was well received by all the panellists.

## **4. Side Events**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The Africa Pavilion accommodated a number of side events, the full list of which is provided in the Annex. The following paragraphs report on a number of selected side events to provide a more in-depth record of the dialogues held within the Africa Pavilion.

### **4.2 Climate Adaptation Governance in Africa: The Challenge Ahead**

#### **4.2.1 Introduction**

The event on climate adaptation governance was organized by the Heinrich Boll Foundation (HBF) and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA). It took place on 29 November 2011.

#### **4.2.2 The panel and moderator**

The panel consisted of: (1) Mr. Richard Colland (University of Cape Town); (2) Ms. Masego Madzwamuse (Economic Justice Programme Manager, Open Society Initiatives for Southern Africa); (3) Ms. Jennifer Katerere (Independent Consultant); (4) Ms. Kulthoum Omari (Sustainable Development Programme Manager, Heinrich Boll Foundation); (5) Mr. Bob Chabaiwa (Advocacy Manager, SADC-CNGO).

#### **4.2.3 Study on climate governance**

At this event a summary was made of the key findings of a study that examined climate change governance issues in seven countries (Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria) on their state of preparedness and what they proposed to do once funding had been secured. The study assessed impacts and vulnerabilities to climate change: climate adaptation policies; plans and strategies; institutional actors involved in climate change policy and response; and the role played by the state. Findings of the study are discussed below.

#### **4.2.4 Policy framework for climate change adaptation governance inadequate**

The study found that most countries lacked a coherent policy framework for climate change adaptation. This was particularly true in countries which had not embarked on a comprehensive planning process for adapting to climate change, often articulated in a country's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and/or in National Climate Change Response Strategies (NCCRS). Countries such as Zimbabwe lacked such plans and strategies. Where such plans did not exist, adaptation tended to be addressed by a plethora of fragmented environment and development policies. Where NAPA/NCCRS existed, they tended to be narrowly focused on biophysical vulnerabilities, to follow sectoral and project approaches to adaptation and fail to facilitate integrated response or account for micro-level adaptation requirements. As a result of these shortcomings, the needs of the most vulnerable sectors in society (women, the poor and small-scale farmers) were not being adequately catered for.

#### **4.2.5 Positioning climate change adaptation within the environment sector results in limiting effective integration**

A review of the environment and development policy framework revealed a tendency to place responsibility for climate change adaptation solely with the environment sector with no reference to other sectoral plans. This had been found to limit public and decision makers' understanding of climate change impacts and the implications for national economies, thereby undermining political buy-in to prioritization and resource mobilization for climate change adaptation. Often guidelines for mainstreaming climate change adaptation into national level planning were not made available to economic planners. Dealing with the impacts of climate change and planning for adaptation was therefore done ex post facto and in an ad hoc manner.

#### **4.2.6 Macroeconomic development frameworks undermine adaptive capacity**

The drive towards attracting foreign direct investment and towards securing industrial competitiveness, fiscal policy and moderation of wage increases so as to attract foreign direct investment and facilitate economic growth marginalized the poor and undermined their adaptive capacity. A review of agricultural policy revealed a bias towards macroeconomic interests in terms of commercial agriculture and technological transfer while the needs of subsistence farmers were under-represented. Most vulnerability and adaptation assessments in the agricultural sector pointed to this bias. Furthermore, capital interests had led to displacement of local land owners and resource users in rural communities to make way for tourism, commercial forestry and agriculture for export, leaving a significant number of rural dwellers landless, without access to biodiversity and natural resources and highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

#### **4.2.7 Gender not mainstreamed into key adaptation response frameworks**

National adaptation strategies did not adequately address aspects of inequality and gender. There were major gaps in adaptation strategies for most of the vulnerable sectors such as agriculture, biodiversity and water in terms of making provisions for gender-related differential impacts of climate change. Provisions which included, among others, security of tenure, provision of technical information such as meteorological and weather forecasts and access to microfinance, as well as opportunities for productive employment were often not adequately enabled and appropriately extended to women. Packaging solutions to suit the needs of the recipients was as important as providing the solutions.

#### **4.2.8 Climate finance and adaptation**

The event also featured discussion on financing climate change adaptation. A speaker from the panel argued that the creation of the Africa Green Fund was a bad and poorly thought out idea. He observed that there was already the challenge of accommodating a multiplicity of sources and that adding yet another source complicated the issue. He also raised a question on how countries' access to the funds could be ensured.

#### **4.2.9 The need for effective governance**

The importance of building climate-sensitive sectors, the need for effective governance and the nature of transformation needs for institutions were noted. It was remarked that a web of factors were reinforcing conflict and that climate change, in particular, multiplied risks, leading to social tensions and growing instability. The issue of gender was also captured: gender equity was needed for successful adaptation and for transition to low carbon development.

#### **4.2.10 Civil society and institutions**

One speaker mentioned that civil society was continuously professionalizing itself to the point of being ineffective. He pointed out that not every African country had a comprehensive climate change strategy. He raised the issue of how we could go about sustaining the momentum and underlined the importance of knowing what local institutions and structures existed and the importance of leadership and resources.

### **4.3 Bridging the Emissions Gap**

#### **4.3.1 Introduction**

This event, organized by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), took place on 1 December 2011.

#### **4.3.2 Panel and moderator**

The panellists were: 1) Mr. Joeri Rogelj (ETH Zurich); 2) Mr. Niklas Hohne (Ecofys); 3) Mr. Joseph Alcamo (UNEP); 4) Mr. Jimmy Adegoke (CSIR); 5) Mr. David Lee (Manchester Metropolitan University) and 6) Mr. P.R. Shukla (Indian Institute of Management). The Chief Scientist of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Joseph Alcamo, introduced the executive summary of the new report *Bridging the Emissions Gap* which reviewed and summarized the latest scientific studies of the gap and how the gap could be bridged. For this report, the UNEP convened 55 scientists and experts from 28 scientific groups across 15 countries.

#### **4.3.3 Summary of the report**

The report concluded that by 2020 global emissions needed to be reduced to 44 Gt if the world was to be on a credible pathway to keeping global warming below 1.5°C or even 2°C. It was to be noted that, following the Copenhagen Accord, 42 industrialized and 44 developing countries had made emissions reduction pledges which were mostly expressed in ranges. In Cancun, the Parties formally recognised these pledges and decided “to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels”. They also left open the option for “strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C”. Even if all countries got to the top end of their pledge ranges to cut emissions and all loopholes (in the form of carryovers, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) (accounting rules) were closed, the gap in 2020 would be 6 Gt, that is to say, as much as the annual emissions of the United States. If countries stuck to their minimal pledges with weak accounting rules, the gap was more likely to be around 11 Gt. Estimates of this gap (6-11 Gt) were larger than reported in the 2010 UNEP Emissions Gap report (5-9 Gt). This gap meant that the world was on course towards a 3.5°C rise in temperature above pre-industrial level.

#### **4.3.4 Bridging the gap**

The panellists, apart from highlighting the gap, also discussed ways of bridging this gap: focusing on energy efficiency and clean, renewable energy; a major drive to halve deforestation; improved waste management and agricultural practices; and taking action in international aviation and shipping.

## **4.4 Adaptation Finance Readiness: Regional Access and Domestic Allocation**

### **4.4.1 Introduction**

This event, organized by the African Climate Policy Centre (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) and OneWorld Sustainable Investments, took place on 1 December 2011. Generally, this event sought to advance the discussion on climate finance going beyond national borders and on how domestic allocation of finances could be used to leverage increased resources from global sources.

### **4.4.2 The panel and moderator**

The panel consisted of: (1) Ms. Monica Scatista (European Investment Bank); (2) Mr. Simon Thuo (Global Water Partnership); (3) Mr. Seleshi Bekele (African Climate Policy Centre); (4) Ms. Clotilde Ngomba (Congo Basin Forest Fund); and (5) Ms. Belynda Petrie (OneWorld).

### **4.4.3 Key questions on adaptation finance readiness for the panellists**

The panellists considered the following issues:

- what the building blocks for regional access should be — multi-country or transboundary projects;
- how the transboundary approaches to natural resources management can transform the legal and institutional framework for climate finance;
- what the legal personalities of institutions involved in financing transboundary and regional initiatives are and whence they derive their mandate;
- what role specific funds with a regional and transboundary scope, such as the Congo Basin Forest Fund, can play in advancing regional access to climate finance; and
- given the situation with regional access, how is the domestic allocation of resources determined and how should/could developing countries usefully account for existing and future spending?

### **4.4.4 Experiences of the European Investment Bank in Africa**

The experience of the European Investment Bank (the financial arm of the EU) in financing regional adaptation efforts in Africa was discussed. The speaker mentioned the case of *Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative*. The initiative, which was launched in August 2004 during Stockholm Water Week, was designed to achieve the Millennium Development Targets for water and sanitation in small urban centres around the Lake Victoria Region. The initiative was designed as a regional programme to be implemented in the East African countries that shared the resources of Lake Victoria. The speaker also mentioned the challenge of getting a return from projects. She asked: “How long is too long for some results to be achieved?” She concluded by saying that the banks were willing and ready with instruments but had questions regarding the potential date at which the money would be returned.

### **4.4.5 The role of legal entities and institutions in transboundary issues**

Another speaker took up the issue relating to legal personalities of institutions involved in financing transboundary and regional initiatives and the source of their mandate. He commented that the key challenges were political commitment and allocation of sufficient resources. He noted that the water sector was not often seen as a force promoting regional and economic integration. Many regional organizations such as COMESA, EAC, and ECOWAS derived their mandate from



member States. He noted that some were also very strong in managing financial resources. He also mentioned regional entities (in the form of commissions and initiatives) organized around common resources. Sources of finance include, according to the speaker, member States, banks and trust funds. The panellist noted that in Africa there were a significant number of transboundary water resources (63 rivers and 38 aquifers). The challenge lay in transforming initiatives into mature institutions. Financial instruments used include grants, loans, bonds and so on. He concluded that private investment was a key factor, for example, in the development of irrigation. Generally, it was argued, transboundary collaboration provided an opportunity to deal with issues that could not be resolved unilaterally.

#### **4.4.6 The Congo Basin Forest Fund**

The experience of the Congo Basin Forest Fund which served 10 countries and was financed by the African Development Bank was also shared with the participants. The speaker raised what she called ‘temporary transboundary problems’: she illustrated the problem with the “elephant that decided to leave DRC and moved to Cameroon”. She underlined the challenges of generating funds for such transnational initiatives as the Congo Basin Forest Fund: “Disbursement of funds is easy but the task will be difficult when it comes to collecting contributions”, she said.

#### **4.4.7 Other points discussed**

Other points which were raised included that:

- We were still using a traditional mind-set with respect to loans. Lending money for factory building should be seen as separate from lending money for climate change. We should regard the globe as one world and our focus should be on social benefits.
- The focus on social benefits was a fundamental element in the choice of projects financed by the European Investment Bank.
- A mix of grant funding and loans was used by the European Investment Bank. However, there would not be enough grant funding.
- there was a misconception that investing in climate activities did not pay off.
- The question arose as to why some kinds of transboundary initiatives failed or took longer than planned?
- Public private partnerships depended on the way the institutional framework was set up. If weak, it would fail.
- One of the problems of managing transboundary resources was that treaties were signed before climate change became evident.

Other challenges raised during the discussion included: varying priorities; the fact that all countries had to endorse a project on a transboundary resources; and that no one would be willing to invest in a project with transboundary benefits.

### **4.5 Jumpstarting the transition to modern energy systems in Africa**

#### **4.5.1 Introduction**

This event, organized by the African Climate Policy Centre (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), took place on 7 December 2011.

#### **4.5.2 Panel and moderator**

The panel consisted of: (1) Mr. Yacob Mulugetta (ACPC/UNECA); (2) Mr. Jean-Yves Caneill (Head of Climate Policy, EDF, France); (3) Ms. Katrina Managan (Johnson Controls Incorporated); (4) Mr. John Christensen (UNEP Risoe Centre); (5) Mr. Francis Yamba (Centre for Energy, Environment and Engineering); and (6) Mr. Irving Mintzer (Potomac Energy Fund). The panel was moderated by Mr. Youba Sokona (ACPC/UNECA).

Over the past few years, a number of African countries have shown ambition and creativity in the way they intend to meet their development goals. One issue that is featured increasingly in these goals is the need to grow in a carbon constrained world. Pursuing a low carbon development strategy is therefore seen as a critical element of development plans and will continue to be the case in the future. To this end, low carbon energy strategies hold a prominent position in all of these plans. However, the question remains as to how to jumpstart and make fully operational a meaningful energy transition that fulfils the development needs of African countries while responding to the challenge of climate change. The challenge is especially daunting for rural areas in Africa given the isolated nature of rural settlements, requiring serious assessment of technology needs, innovations in finance and institutional development and the design of appropriate policy instruments. The side event was designed to stimulate debate on the energy-development nexus and identify drivers and barriers to transitions to modern energy technology in Africa.

#### **4.5.3 Key questions on jumpstarting the transition to modern energy systems**

The panellists focused their discussion on a number of critical questions:

- Why does the problem of energy access persist in Africa?
- What promising low carbon energy technology options exist that are suitable and ready for conditions in Africa to provide energy for productive purposes?
- What are the key drivers for future energy transitions to modern energy technology for development and what are the critical intervention areas?
- Are existing institutions and policies appropriate and adequate for jumpstarting energy transitions in Africa?
- What lessons can African energy policymakers draw from the experience of others, particularly from Asian countries?
- What financing opportunities exist and how suitable are they for jumpstarting energy transitions and what innovative finances are available to support energy activities in Africa?

#### **4.5.4 Experiences of EDF deploying rural electricity services**

The experience of EDF (power supply company) in the development and deployment of Rural Electricity Services Company as a business model was discussed. It was noted that such companies had been tried in South Africa, Botswana, Mali, Morocco and Senegal. They used the standard technologies such as solar panels and windmills. EDF provided a subsidy (about 60 to 80 per cent of the initial start-up investment) and provided technical assistance. Other than this subsidy, the company was expected to operate as a commercial enterprise.

#### **4.5.5 Experiences of Johnson Controls Incorporated in improving energy efficiency**

The experience of Johnson Controls Incorporated in improving energy efficiency was also presented to participants. The speaker noted that the small upfront investment in efficiency paid for

itself many times over in cost savings. She shared the experience of an initiative in Mexico which offered free refrigerators in exchange for old ones, a practice used to overcome the financial barrier in energy efficiency.

#### **4.5.6 Energy access**

Another speaker noted that the current discourse on energy access seemed currently limited to expanding access for household use. The success of this discourse and initiatives informed by the discourse was limited because of restricted levels of disposable income. He argued for re-focusing the issue away from household access and towards access for the productive sector. An argument was also made for public ownership of large-scale energy projects in Africa. Another speaker underlined the need to create sustainable demand and markets.

#### **4.5.7 Energy and productivity**

The panel agreed that there was a need to focus on the role of energy in expanding the productive sector. It was argued that money was the key element to achieving this end. It was crucial to have innovative sources of energy. Two challenges were identified. First, how was financial capital to be mobilized? Second, how could be ensured that the capital was recycled repeatedly through medium- and small-scale companies? On the issue of mobilization, there was a need to look into ways of bringing to the table institutional capital such as labour union funds in developed countries. Public sources would be limited and in this connection the speaker identified the prevailing problems in Japan (earthquake), European Union (economic problems) and United States (budget problem). As a result, it was asserted that a substantial portion must come from private sources. The speaker mentioned the possibility of a financial levy on bunker fuels as an example.

#### **4.5.8 Recommendations**

The event concluded with three important recommendations, namely that:

- policymakers needed to focus on energy for productive use as the important driver for the energy transition and not be limited to household energy challenges;
- there was a need for a cross-sectoral approach to advance the energy transition agenda given the cross-cutting nature of energy and the central role it played in development (both social and economic);
- financing for modern energy technologies was critical. It was important to think beyond the traditional sources of finance which had not served Africa's interests. There were innovative climate finance sources that could offer benefits such as raising finance through levy on international transport services;
- it was essential that policy, research and practitioner communities should work together to build the appropriate knowledge-base and bring concrete experience on the ground to inform the policy terrain.

### **5. Africa's Expectations and the Durban Outcomes**

#### **5.1 Africa's Expectations from Durban**

Africa went to Durban with two principal expectations: the implementation and operation of the Cancun Agreements (and, more particularly, ensuring that the report of the Transitional Committee on Green Fund was adopted by the conference) and agreement on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. The Cancun Agreements, apart from reaffirming the fast-start and

long-term financing commitments of developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord, also established two important institutions: the Global Green Fund and the Standing Committee on Finance. The design of the Global Green Fund was entrusted to a Transitional Committee. Just before the Durban Conference, the Transitional Committee completed its work and prepared a draft report for presentation there. At the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) meeting held before the conference in Durban, it was stated that the Transitional Committee's report was consistent with the African Position. It was anticipated that some countries might wish to open the debate on the report. In aiming to protect the African Position, CAHOSCC underlined that it was critical that all means should be deployed to prevent a debate on the report and engage the parties that had expressed their reservations on the content of the report.

Given that the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol would come to an end at the end of 2012, Canada, Japan and Russia had declared that they would not take further quantified emissions reduction commitments under the protocol. Other Annex-I parties had indicated their conditional willingness to sign up to a second commitment period. The European Union had expressed its support as part of a wider outcome that engages all major economies. New Zealand and Australia had expressed their willingness to sign up to a second commitment period provided that it was part of a balanced agreement which included all major emitters, with a strengthened and unified set of accounting rules.

The position of Africa was that a second commitment period was absolutely essential to the interests of Africa in that the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol constituted the fundamental global legal framework on climate change. CAHOSCC underlined the need to engage Parties with the purpose of having a second commitment period. However, in the event that this could not be achieved, it was agreed that the essential elements (mainly the institutional infrastructure and the flexibility mechanisms) of the protocol should be salvaged.

## **5.2 Outcomes of Durban**

### **5.2.1 The Durban Platform**

The conference in Durban which took place from 29 November to 13 December 2011, running for two more days than originally planned, launched yet another platform for negotiations and delivered decisions on implementing many of the decisions in the Cancun Agreements and having a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. From the African perspective, the conference can be considered successful because it satisfied Africa's two main expectations in going to Durban, as discussed above.

The Durban Conference established a subsidiary body known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, through which a process was launched "to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties". It was decided that this subsidiary body should complete its work at the latest by 2015 so that there would be an adequate period of time to obtain the required ratifications for the outcome of the negotiations to come into effect from 2020. The negotiations within this platform would cover issues relating to mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action, and support and capacity-building.

### **5.2.2 Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol**

The Durban Conference also adopted a decision to have a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The second commitment period, which would run from 1 January 2013, could

either be five or seven years long. The precise length would be determined by a decision of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its seventeenth session. It must be noted that the shorter option might lead to a gap between the Kyoto Protocol and the outcome of the Durban Platform coming into force. The aggregate target of the second commitment period was to ensure that aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases by Annex I parties were reduced by at least 25-40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. However, given that Japan, Russia and Canada refused to sign up to the second commitment period and that United States was not a party to the protocol, it was not clear how this aggregate objective could be achieved.

The targets for each of the Annex I countries which were Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which had agreed to the second commitment period were included in an annex to the decision. The parties also agreed to convert such targets into quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QELROS) and to communicate the results by 1 May 2012 for consideration by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its seventeenth session. The Working Group would submit the results of its work to the next conference in Doha with a view to amending Annex B of the protocol.

### **5.2.3 The Green Climate Fund**

The Cancun Agreements established the Green Climate Fund which was expected to administer a significant part of the USD 100 billion which developed countries had agreed to mobilize by 2020. The Durban Conference approved the governing instrument of the fund, which it also designated as the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the convention. During the negotiations several issues related to the fund created points of divergence among the Parties. For example, in opposition to the proposal by many of the developing countries, United States advocated its firm belief that the fund should not be accorded a legal personality. Eventually, however, the conference representatives decided that the fund should be conferred with both juridical personality and legal capacity. Other points of contention included the identity of the host country, the trustee and secretariat of the fund. The Board of the fund was charged with several functions which would determine how quickly the fund would discharging its core responsibilities. These included:

- Developing a transparent no-objection procedure to ensure consistency with national climate strategies and plans and a country driven approach; to provide for effective direct and indirect public and private sector financing by the fund;
- Balancing the allocation of resources between adaptation and mitigation activities;
- Establishing necessary policies and procedures, which would enable an early and adequate replenishment process;
- Selection of the host country;
- Together with the host country, developing the legal and administrative arrangements for hosting the fund and ensuring that juridical personality and legal capacity were conferred on the fund and that such privileges and immunities as were necessary were granted to the fund and its officials in an expedited manner;
- Establishing an independent secretariat of the fund in the host country as soon as possible;
- Selection of the trustee of the fund through an open, transparent and competitive bidding process in a timely manner to ensure that there was no discontinuity in trustee services;
- Initiating a process to collaborate with the Adaptation Committee and the Technology Executive Committee, as well as other relevant thematic bodies under the convention, to define linkages between the fund and these bodies, as appropriate; and

- Appointment of the interim secretariat based on the criteria set by the Durban Conference.

Pursuant to the decision by the Durban Conference, the Board was to consist of 24 members divided equally between developed and developing countries. The Conference further determined how the membership quota for developing countries was further disaggregated geographically and regarding the negotiating clubs of parties. For example, Africa would be represented by four members and LDCs by one member. It would be up to groups of parties such as Africa and LDCs to nominate their representatives but members would be expected to have the necessary experience and skills in the areas of climate change and development finance. Due consideration should also be given to gender balance. The Board would be chaired by two co-chairs, one from developed and the other from developing countries, elected by the board members. Reflecting how decisions were adopted by COP, provision was also made that decisions made by the Board would be adopted by consensus and the Board was tasked with developing procedures for adopting decisions in the event that unanimity could not be obtained. The Board would also develop and operate accreditation processes to allow for the participation of observers in its meetings. In particular, four active observers would be invited to participate—two civil society representatives and two private sector representatives.

The governing instrument of the fund recognized that the main access modalities would be direct access through accredited national implementing entities and indirect access through accredited multilateral implementing entities. This was an improvement on the way the Global Environment Facility operated and mirrored the way the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol functioned. As a marked improvement on the latter, however, it also recognized the need to provide resources for enhancing the capacity of the institutions of developing country Parties with a view to ensuring that they satisfied the fiduciary principles and standards and environmental and social safeguards, which were prerequisites to accreditation. The Adaptation Fund allowed the direct access modality. However, only three national institutions in Africa had been accredited by the Adaptation Fund. One reason for this was the inability of national institutions in Africa to satisfy the fiduciary standards which were prerequisites to accreditation. In this regard, therefore, the provision that mandated the Green Climate Fund to provide resources for enhancing the ability of institutions to meet the accreditation standards offered an improvement to existing conditions.

#### **5.2.4 Mitigation Commitments by Developed Countries**

In Cancun the parties, after recognizing mitigation targets submitted by developed countries following the Copenhagen Accord, urged the latter to increase their ambition to reduce their aggregate emissions to a level consistent with the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report. In addition, the secretariat was requested to organize workshops to clarify the underlying assumptions and conditions of such targets, including the use of carbon credits from the market-based mechanisms and land use, land-use change and forestry activities (LULUCF), and options and ways to increase their level of ambition. Two such workshops were held in 2011 in Bangkok and Bonn. The Durban Conference acknowledged the gap between the aggregate level of reduction expected from pledges by developing and developed countries and the level needed to maintain the temperature rise below 2<sup>0</sup>C.<sup>6</sup> The Conference reiterated its call to developed countries to increase the level of their proposed targets to be consistent with the fourth and subsequent IPCC assessment reports. It also recognized that the clarification of targets by developed countries built confidence and trust among the parties. Accordingly, it was decided to continue the process of clarification through workshops in 2012. The objective of the workshops was to understand assumptions and conditions related to individual targets, in particular in relation to the base year, global warming potential values,

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<sup>6</sup> UNEP, *Bridging the Emissions Gap: A UNEP Synthesis Report* (2011).

coverage of gases, coverage of sectors, expected emissions reductions, the role of land use, land-use change and forestry and the use of offsets.

The Cancun Conference decided that developed countries should submit biennial reports detailing mitigation actions taken to achieve their reduction targets and reductions achieved, projected emissions and financial, technology and capacity-building support provided to developing countries. It also decided to develop guidelines for the biennial reports. The Durban Conference adopted guidelines on the preparation of biennial reports by developed countries.

The Cancun Conference also established a process under the SBI for the international assessment and review (IAR) of biennial reports of developed countries. It also established a work programme for the development of modalities and procedures for the IAR. The Durban Conference recognized that the IAR process should promote comparability of targets and performance among all developed countries and that it should be efficient, cost-effective and practical without imposing excessive burden on parties and the secretariat. It also decided that the process should consist of a technical review, the biennial report and a multilateral assessment of implementation of targets. The Conference also adopted modalities and procedures for IAR.

### **5.2.5 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions by Developing Countries**

The Cancun Conference took note of the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) submitted by developing countries in accordance with the Copenhagen Accord. The Conference agreed to discuss the NAMAs in workshops to understand their diversity, underlying assumptions and any support needed for implementation of these actions. The Durban Conference decided to continue in 2012 efforts to understand through workshops the diversity of mitigation actions by developing countries. Matters to be considered included underlying assumptions and methodologies, sectors and gases covered, global warming potential values used, support needs for implementation of the mitigation actions and estimated mitigation outcomes. The workshops were also intended to build confidence and trust among Parties and share experience in the low-emission development strategies by developing countries.

The Cancun Agreements imposed a requirement on developing countries to submit biennial update reports containing updates of national greenhouse gas inventories, including a national inventory report and information on mitigation actions, needs and support received. The Durban Conference adopted the guidelines for the biennial update reports.

The Cancun Conference decided to set up a registry to record NAMAs seeking international support and to facilitate matching of support to these actions. It also launched a work programme for the development of modalities and guidelines for facilitation of support to mitigation actions through the registry. The Durban Conference decided that the registry should be a dynamic, web-based platform managed by a dedicated team in the secretariat and structured in a flexible manner to accommodate the diversity of mitigation actions and a range of support types. Participation in the registry system would be voluntary and it should only record information submitted expressly for that. The Conference indicated information that should be submitted by developing countries with respect to mitigation actions for which they were seeking international support, which should be submitted by developed countries with respect to support available and provided to developing countries. The secretariat was charged with providing assistance to developing countries seeking information on available sources of support in the registry. The secretariat was requested to develop and present a prototype of the registry to the 36<sup>th</sup> session of SBI with a view to improving its design.

At the Cancun Conference, it was agreed that internationally supported mitigation actions by developing countries would be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification.

Domestically supported mitigation actions would be measured, reported and verified domestically but would be subject to international consultation and analysis. In addition, biennial update reports would be subject to international consultation and analysis. The Conference also launched a work programme for the development of modalities and guidelines for the international consultation and analysis. The Durban Conference adopted these modalities and guidelines designed to make the process efficient, cost-effective, non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty. The general guidelines for domestic measurement, reporting, and verification of domestically supported mitigation actions had yet to be developed by SBSTA.

### **5.2.6 REDD+**

The Cancun Conference encouraged developing countries to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities on the basis of their respective capabilities and national circumstances: (i) reducing emissions from deforestation; (ii) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (iii) conservation of forest carbon stocks; and (iv) sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. It was decided that these activities should be implemented in phases, beginning with the development of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity-building, followed by the implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity building, technology development and transfer and results-based demonstration activities, evolving into results-based actions that should be fully measured, reported and verified. The AWG-LCA was charged with exploring the financing options for the full implementation of the results-based actions. The Durban Conference mandated the AWG-LCA to develop modalities and procedures for financing results-based actions and to report on progress made (including any recommendations) to the Conference to be held in Doha.

### **5.2.7 The Adaptation Committee**

The Cancun Adaptation Framework was established to enhance adaptation efforts by all countries. The Framework identified a broad set of priority areas for action. These included: (i) a process to assist LDCs to plan, prioritize and implement their adaptation actions; (ii) improve climate-related research and systematic observation and information management systems; (iii) strengthen institutions; (iv) support impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments, including assessment of financial needs as well as evaluation of adaptation options; (v) undertake transfer of technologies, practices and processes and capacity building for adaptation. As part of the framework, an Adaptation Committee was created to raise the importance of adaptation within UNFCCC and to provide technical support to Parties to ensure a more coherent, action-oriented engagement with the issues. More specifically, the Committee was mandated to promote the implementation of enhanced action through: technical support and guidance; enhancing information-sharing on good practices; promoting synergy and strengthening engagement of organizations, centres and networks; providing information on good practices concerning means to incentivize adaptation implementation and reduce vulnerability; and considering communications by Parties on monitoring and review of adaptation actions with an aim to recommend further actions. AWG-LCA was tasked with elaborating the composition of, and modalities and procedures for, the Adaptation Committee, for adoption by the Conference. The Durban Conference elaborated the composition of, and determined modalities and procedures for, the Adaptation Committee.

## **6. Conclusion**

The Africa Pavilion as an umbrella of different kinds of events and services was well attended. The organizations worked with the Republic of South Africa towards this effect. The round tables, side events and Africa Day provided opportunities to discuss climate change in



relation to Africa's development. The different countries and organizations had a chance to showcase their activities in the area of climate change and development and it certainly provided them with a forum for consultation for future activities.

The Durban Conference, despite overrunning by two days, eventually delivered on the two priority demands of Africa: adoption of the governing instrument of the Green Climate Fund and the second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. The other outcome of the Conference, the launching of the Durban Platform, provided an opportunity for universal participation (not necessarily uniform in its form and content) needed to prevent the rise of temperature beyond acceptable levels.

There are, however, a number of issues that need to be resolved and require further negotiation. Africa should play an enhanced role for the Conference and countries through appropriate platforms to quickly reach agreement on sources of finance. Negotiations should draw insights from the report by the Working Group appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The fund should also be adequately capitalized. Representatives of Africa and LDCs in the Board play a critical role in ensuring that the policies and arrangements, necessary for the fund to start delivering on its principal functions of mobilizing and allocating financial resources, are adopted as quickly as possible.

The Review of the long-term temperature goal agreed in the Cancun Conference is another important issue for Africa to ensure that the global goal of temperature rise (2°C) does not expose Africa to unacceptable risks. Therefore, the African Group of Negotiators, AMCEN and CAHOSCC should enhance their efforts to ensure that an agreement on the scope and other elements of the Review is reached as early as possible. There is also a pressing need to ensure that the amendments to the Kyoto Protocol are adopted next year and that there will not be a gap between the first and second commitment period.

In this light, therefore, it is important to support the African Group of Negotiators, AMCEN and CAHOSCC in their endeavour. This requires the three main institutions behind the organization of the Africa Pavilion, namely AUC, AfDB and UNECA, to coordinate and enhance the kind of support they provide to the group. Through analysis of the Durban platform and issues yet to be determined in future negotiations, areas where further research support could be provided by ACPC-UNECA should be agreed and implemented. AfDB plays an important role in providing financial support with a view to ensuring effective participation of the group in negotiation and preparatory sessions. AUC plays an important role in mobilisation and provision of political, financial and other forms of support and coordinating UNECA and AfDB.

**Annex: List of Side Events**

No.	Name of Event	Speakers	Date, time and place
1	Climate change adaptation in Africa	Mr. Saleemul Huq Dr. Tom Downing Ms. Emily Massawa Mr. Al-Hamndou Darsouma Mr. John Ward Dr. Mbarack Diop	1 December 2011, 11:30-13:00, Desert Room
2	Adaptation to climate change-A Kenyan perspective	Dr. Harun Warui Mr. Cleophas Wangombe Eng. Moses Omedi Mr. Ali D. Mohamed Prof. Francis Lelo Dr. Chris Gakahu Mr. Richard Fox	1 December 2011, 13:20-14:40, Desert Room
3	How local communities can build their resilience (Local Agenda 21)	Mr. Sena Alouka Ms. Karuna Rana Mr. Kanlisson Damien Colette Benodji Hountondji Mawuse	1 December 2011, 15:00-16:30, River Room
4	Progress in regional climate downscaling for Africa	Mr. Joseph Daron Mr. Richard Jones Mr. Joseph Intsiful Ms. Mzime Murisa	1 December 2011, 11:30-13:00, River Room
5	Discussion on geo-engineering	Dr. Jason J Blackstock Dr. Mulugeta Mengist Ayalew Dr. Clarisse Kehler Siebert	2 December 2011, 9:00-11:00, Desert Room
6	Agriculture and climate change in Africa		2 December 2011, 11:30-13:00, Desert Room
7	Green economy modelling		2 December 2011, 09:00-14:40, Rainforest Room
8	Hidden lands: Ensuring transparency in acquisition and allocation. Managing land acquisition and the interest of local communities	Mr. Ken Johm Dr. Gaynor Paradza Dr. Josue Dione Mr. M.E. Chipeta Mr. Ndaiaye Moulamet Lamine Hon. Sisa Njikelana	2 December 2011, 11:30-13:00, Rainforest Room
8	Lessons learned in agriculture and climate: Experiences with agricultural production and small farmers (Mali case study)	Mr. Alexander Muller Dr. Alamir S. Toure Ms. Nadine Azzu Mr. Adama Kouyate Mr. Souleymane Cisse	2 December 2011, 13:20-14:40, Rainforest Room

9	Sources of climate finance		2 December, 16:45-18:15
10	Vanishing forests: can the trend be reversed through sustainable management?	Ms. Marta Monjane Mr. Gerhard Diertele Mr. Martin Tadoum Mr. Richard E. Atyi Mr. Abdoulaye Dagamaissa Mr. Alfred Gichu Mr. Ken John	2 December 2011, 15:00-16:30, Rainforest Room
11	Building Disaster Resilience	Mr. Aneson Cadribo Dr. Pedro Basabe Dr. Khalil Timamy Mr. Adama Alhassane Diallo Mayor Al Arquillano Prof. Laban Ogallo Ms. Rhoda Peace	3 December, 9:00-11:00, Desert Room
12	Global policy solutions for adaptation and mitigation	Ms. Rhoda Peace Dr. Ania Grobicki Mr. Anders Berntell Mr. Chris Moseki Mr. Carlos Manuel Rodriguez Mr. Simon Thou Mr. Bai Maas Taal Dr. Mahmoud Abu-Zeid	3 December 2011, 09:00-12:00, River Room
13	Water Day and High Level Dialogue Day 1: Session 2: Infrastructure, technical and ecosystem solutions	Mr. Trevor Balzer Mr. Sering Jallow Mr. Colin Herron Mr. Frank Lowenstein	3 December 2011, 12:00-13:00, River Room
14	Financial and institutional solutions	Ms. Monica Scatasta Prof. Mike Muller Mr. Aly Abou-Sabaa Mr. Nigel Topping Mr. Paul Simpson	3 December 2011, 15:00-16:00, River Room
15	Leadership for environment and development	Mr. Raphael B. Omotogunja Ms. Maureen Atkintayo Mr. Tunde Imolehin	4 December 2011, 11:30-13:00
16	Nutrition and climate change: Making the connection to enhance livelihoods, resilience, health and women's empowerment	Mr. Carlos Dora Mr. Robin Means Ms. Sheila Sisulu Mr. Alexander Muller Ms. Jaspreet Kindra Ms. Cristina Tirado	4 December 2011, 18:30-20:00, Desert Room
17	Investing in REDD in the Democratic Republic of Congo		5 December 2011, 09:00-11:00, Desert Room
18	Climate change and African forest resources	Ms. Linda Mossop-Rousseau Mr. Godwin Kowero Mr. Jochen Statz Ms. Julia Randimbisoa Mr. Oliver Gardi	5 December, 11:30-13:00, Desert Room
19	Launch of Africa Atlas	Mr. Tom Downing	5 December 2011, 13:20:14:40
20	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions	Ms. Caroline De Wit Ms. Ken John Ms. Amanda Souley Massaoudou Mr. William Kojo Agyemang Bonsu	5 December 2011, 15:30-16:30, Rainforest Room

		Mr. Masayuki Karasawa Mr. Seyni Nafo	
21	Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR)	H.E. Ali'ioaigi F. Elisaia Dr. Andrew Steer Prof. Abdelkrim Ben Mohammed Mr. Hopeerton Peterson Hon. Chichova Ana	5 December 2011, 09:00-11:00, River Room
22	Climate change adaptation and development: a mainstreaming approach	Ms. Kanta Kumari Mr. Al-Hamndou Dorsuma Mr. Alfred Hans Grunwaldt Mr. Mbarack Digo Mr. Tom Downing Mr. Mark New	5 December 2011, 11:30-13:00, River Room
23	Get inside the Scoop: Energy markets in Africa	Mr. Carlos Calvacanti Mr. Kurt Lonsway Ms. Carolin Limbo	5 December 2011, 15:00-16:00, River Room
24	Green growth: The potential for Africa	Mr. Simon Zadek Mr. Jean-Yves Caneil Ms. Buchi Msekela Mr. Muyeye Chambwera Ms. Amai-Lee Amin Ms. Sharmala Naidoo Ms. Hela Cheikhrouhhou Mr. Richard Va Leenwen	5 December 2011, 11:30-13:00, River Room
25	Women's representation in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)	Ms. Adiola Akiyode-Afolabi Hon. Ayo Adewole Ms. Osprey Lake Ms. Rosemary Enie Mr. Surveyor Efik	6 December 2011, 16:00-18:15, Desert Room
26	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment	Mr. Richard Kinley Hon. Manyane Moleleki Hon. Edna Mdlewa Mr. Bali Taal Mr. Anders Berntell Mr. Jose Valencia	6 December 2011, 09:00-11:15, River Room
27	Implementation of AU/NEPAD Environment Action Plan	Ms. Estherine Fotabong Dr. Ibrahim A. Mayaki H.E. Ms. Rhode Peace Mr. Mounkaila Goumandakoye Mr. Stuart Mangold Mr. Peter Acquah Dr. Thomas Tata Mr. Augustine Njamnshi Prof. John Mugabe	6 December 2011, 11:40-13:20, River Room
28	Gender and climate smart agriculture	Ms. Estherine Fotabong, PIVD-NPCA H.E. Ms. Tadesse Zenebu, Minister of Women, Children and Youth Affairs, Ethiopia Dr. Ibrahim Mayaki, CEO, NEPAD Agency Mr. Arvinn Eikeland Gadgil, Advisor, Norwegian MOFA Ms. Priscilla Akchapa, WEP, Nigeria Ms. Guta Atsede, Advisor,	7 December 2011, 09:25-11:25, Desert Room

		Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs, Ethiopia Ms. Wendi Losha Bernadette, Rural Women Services, Cameroon Ms. Maria D. Phiri, COMESA	
29	Congo Basin Forest Fund: Making REDD+ a reality in Congo Basin countries	Ms. Clotilda Ngomba, Congo Basin Forest Fund Mr. Georges Wamukoya, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Mr. Raymond Lumemamo, World Wildlife Fund/RDC Mr. Laurent Some, World Wildlife Fund Africa Ms. Danae Maniatis, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Mr. Stub Tove, Ministry of Environment, Norway Mr. Martin Tadoum, COMIFAC (Commission for the Forestation of Central Africa) Mr. Vincent Kasulu, UNFCCC Mr. Timothy Mealey, Meridian Institute H.E. Henri Ndjombo, Republic of Congo H.E. Gregory Barker, United Kingdom	07 December 2011, 10:00-13:00, Rainforest Room
30	Realizing the potential: Making the most of climate finance in Africa		2 December 2011, 15:40-16:00
31	Climate Investment Funds: Investing in renewable energy for development in Africa	Ms. Hela Cheikhrouhou Mr. Caleb Indiarsi Mr. Dicky Edwin Hindarto Dr. Steve Lenon Mr. Abderrahim El Hafidi Mr. Alassane Agalassou	7 December 2011, 09:00-11:00, River Room
32	Towards a new energy strategy for Africa	Mr. Sakkie Leimecke Mr. Eric Usher Ms. Hela Cheikhrouhou	7 December, 11:30-13:00, River Room
33	Land, water and forests: The foundations for climate resilient development in Africa		8 December 2011, 14:30-16:00, Africa Pavilion
34	PACJA Event—AMCEN and Africa Group Feedback and Consultation with African Civil Society	Mr. Seyni Nafu, Spokesperson, African Group of Negotiators	9 December, 13:50-14:20, Africa Pavilion
35	Fresh and Young Brains Development Initiative	Ms. Nkiruka Nnaemego, CEO/Founder, Fresh & Young Brains Development Initiative Mr. Sulaimon Arigbabu, Executive Secretary, HEDA Resource Centre Dr. Chukwumerije Okereke,	9 December 2011, 15:30-17:30, Africa Pavilion

		Associate Professor of Environment and Development, University of Oxford Mr. Isaiah Owolabi Mr. Helder Malguene, African Youth Panel Mr. Adebola Olanrewaju Mr. Surveyor Efik	
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