

CCHA



PHOTOGRAPH BY IFRC

Contents

Introduction

The climate change campaign in a snapshot Key Messages Expected Outcomes Target Audiences

What you can do at field and regional level

What is the role of CISB in the campaign?

What support is available from CISB?

What campaign material is available?

Other support

What support is available from DVPS? What support is available from DPSS? What support is available from EPS?

Annex One: Note on Key Messages

Annex Two: IASC Key Messages – March 2009

Annex Three: OCHA Key Messages – Poznan version December 2008

Annex Four: Broader Talking Points – 10 March 2009

Annex Five: Speech by USG Sir John Holmes to the UK Parliament lunchtime event "The Humanitarian Implications of Climate Change" – 18 March 2009

Annex Six: Terms Of Reference – IASC Communications and Media Subgroup

Annex Seven: Supporting graphs

For campaign materials and resources see: OCHA public website: www.ochaonline.un.org/climatechange OCHANET (Intranet): http://ochanet.unocha.org/CA/Advocacy/Pages/ClimateChangeCampaign.aspx



Introduction

Advocacy is at the core of OCHA's role, and this campaign is designed to make the most of our many opportunities to raise awareness on issues of major strategic concern to the humanitarian community and in support of those affected by disaster and crises.

Launched in late December 2008, the climate change campaign aims to leverage the entire advocacy potential of OCHA and its partners, on the basis that a well-coordinated and sustained approach to advocacy stands a far better chance of leading to a tangible outcome.

This climate change campaign toolkit aims to provide OCHA teams with the materials and resources needed to engage with the campaigns and promote the OCHA position with relevant stakeholders in field, regional and head office environments.

The climate change campaign in a snapshot

The OCHA campaign aims to raise awareness of the humanitarian implications of climate change and call for significant investment in disaster risk reduction and preparedness.

While the campaign seeks to raise awareness of media, Member States and other relevant stakeholders globally, particular effort will be targeted at supporting efforts to ensure that humanitarian concerns are clearly communicated to media and State Parties in the run up to the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009.

Key messages

The OCHA campaign messages, detailed in a separate document, are summarised as follows:

• Humanitarians are witnessing the effects of climate change today, and scientists warn of more extreme climate events to come;

The most affected are people living on the frontline of climate disasters in risk-prone countries;

They are especially vulnerable due to poverty, insecurity, environmental degradation / eco-system decline – and face a desperate future without support. In particular, forced displacement and migration are likely to be key impacts of climate change;

■ Many of these humanitarian consequences can be

averted or reduced with the right approach and this means a far greater investment in disaster risk reduction and preparedness;

As OCHA we especially call for more attention, resources and expertise to be channeled into disaster preparedness to ensure an effective response (Hyogo Priority Five) This means a) dedicated and consistent funding for preparedness, b) focusing efforts on improving national (including local) preparedness in risk-prone countries;

Floods, storms and droughts need not be disasters, but we must 'act sooner and act smarter'.

These campaign messages reinforce the broader IASC position on climate change, as outlined in the common messages below, which were agreed by the IASC Informal Task Force communications sub-group *(See Annex Two).*

OCHA



Expected outcomes

The OCHA campaign will continue up to the Copenhagen Conference (COP15) in December 2009. Three broad success criteria are that the campaign:

Raises awareness of the humanitarian implications of climate change with global media, Member States and governments;

• Encourages greater investment and commitment of attention, resources and expertise for disaster risk reduction and preparedness in risk-prone countries;

■ Helps to ensure that humanitarian concerns are fully reflected in the Copenhagen Agreement (COP15).

Target audiences

There are two specific target audiences for OCHA:

Mainstream media

• to raise public awareness of the humanitarian challenges of climate change and;

• to generate public support for a strong global climate change agreement.

Member States and national governments

• to raise awareness of the humanitarian challenges of climate change;

• to garner support for greater investment in disaster risk reduction, preparedness and;

• to help secure a strong climate agreement in Copenhagen.



What you can do at field and regional level

At field and regional level

The ability of offices to help promote the campaign will depend on respective priorities, workload and staffing levels. It is also recognised that not all offices will be able to easily link the campaign to their ongoing work. However, as a minimum, all offices should ensure that OCHA staff, key partners and key media are aware of the campaign, its messages and resources available.

For other offices the campaign will dovetail more easily with ongoing work. In particular, the Regional Offices should be well placed to help promote the campaign through their ongoing disaster preparedness and response work. Below are suggestions on how to help promote the campaign at a field or regional level. The following is not prescriptive and there may well be a number of other ideas that are not shown. This is a dynamic list and other suggestions are welcome.

Brief the OCHA team:

Internal brief and sharing of campaign materials to OCHA staff, so all are fully aware of aims and key messages.

Brief Key Partners:

Brief and sharing of campaign materials with Humanitarian Coordinator, UN team, IASC, NGO, civil society groups and national government partners.
Inform that all advocacy materials can be used
Explore synergies and forthcoming events or initiatives where campaign can be promoted.

Brief Media:

Briefing and sharing of campaign aims and messages with selected media either bi-laterally or in tandem with related event.

Seek opportunities to brief media on campaign messages.

Carry out media outreach:

HQ press releases will be shared in run up to main events for redistribution at a local or regional level.
Seek opportunities to brief media on campaign messages (e.g. make use of disaster events to draw attention to campaign.)

Use local events as opportunities to screen slideshow, power point or discussion on campaign issues.

Engage with key stakeholders:

■ Make use of existing campaign material in meetings with member states, donors and government agences and with other relevant groups.

Tailor campaign to your region or country:

Include local examples where climate change has had an impact on communities, livelihoods.
Tailor materials – e.g. slideshow, power point – to your region or local circumstances.

Help drive the campaign

■ For this campaign to be a success, we need to communicate to target audiences compelling and practical examples of how climate change is affecting vulnerable communities and humanitarian activities; or of how people and systems are adapting to the challenge.

• We need your help to gather good examples that can be used in future communication materials. Examples could include: humanitarian impacts of extreme weather; adaptation by local communities, or governments; improvements in disaster risk reduction and response preparedness due to repeated climatic events.

Help improve the campaign

Share any campaign related initiatives, adopted products, press releases or other materials with CISB to improve the overall campaign.

Constructive feedback and suggestions for improving the toolkit and the campaign is welcome.

OCHA



What is the role of CISB in the campaign?

The OCHA Communications and Informations Services Branch (CISB) is engaged in ensuring:

that OCHA offices have access to the tools, resources, guidance and support needed to promote the campaign.

a sustained media outreach in the run-up to the UNFCCC Copenhagen Conference (COP15) in December.

a joined-up approach to communications with humanitarian partners through the chairing of the communications sub-group of the IASC Task Force (See Annex Six).

What support is available from CISB?

Content Production: Producing, updating campaign content and materials as required.

■ **Content Distribution:** Ensuring content is made available to all offices through multiple channels – via web, DVD, intranet, email, etc.

■ Materials: The Visual Media Unit can help tailor and format campaign materials to local specifications or languages. Requests need to be channeled through the contact below.

• Messaging: CISB can help brief and clarify questions relating to the campaign messaging. This is especially important as messages are likely to evolve in the course of the year, and should be tailored to specific audiences.

Campaign coordination: CISB will also set up a climate change focal point group to facilitate communication, support and a coordinated approach within OCHA.

Contact: Mark Dalton daltonm@un.org



What campaign material is available?

Campaign resources – including multi-media content and other resources – can be found on the OCHA intranet and OCHA website. Slideshows, video trailers, power points and talking points can be used for presentations, and adapted and tailored with the help of the OCHA Visual Media Unit, if required.

A list of current materials includes:

- Key Messages
- Film Trailer Act Sooner Act Smarter
- Slideshow Act Sooner Act Smarter
- Case Study Mozambique 2007 Flood Response
- Slideshow Mozambique 2007: Good Disaster

Preparedness in Practice

Other Support

What support is available from DVPS?

The Disaster and Vulnerability Policy Section (DVPS) in PDSB leads on overall policy issues, research and analysis on climate change; and drafts talking points, speeches, and policy support to the ERC. DVPS also represents OCHA in the IASC Informal Taskforce on Climate Change, and serves as the focal point for contact with the climate change negotiation process and the Secretary General's Climate Change Team.

DVPS can provide substantive support on policy issues relating to climate change. See www.reliefweb. int/climate_change for details on reports and studies.

Contact: Jenty Kirsch-Wood

kirsch-wood@un.org

- Power point (based on Act Sooner Act Smarter slideshow)
- Photo Galleries
- Key Policy Documents
- Links and Resources
- Film Trailer Road to Copenhagen

What support is available from DPSS?

The Displacement and Support Section (DPSS) can provide technical and staffing support on issues related to forced displacement and climate change. Details on the internal displacement campaign can be found on www.ochaonline.un.org.

Contact:	
Victoria Metcalfe	metcalfe@un.org
Anne-Marie Linde	lindea@un.org

What support is available from EPS?

Climate change and disaster response preparedness: The Emergency Preparedness Section (EPS) can provide support and advice on the adaptation of preparedness activities to the effects of climate change. See OCHA Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit: http://ocha.unog.ch/drptoolkit/.

Contact: Vladimir Sakharov Anton Santanen

sakharov@un.org santanen@un.org



ANNEX 1: Note on key messages

These are brief notes on the two sets of key messages and the talking points below. These messages have been cleared for public use. Please contact daltonm@un.org for any clarifications on messaging or sourcing of data and statistics.

IASC Key messages (in Annex Two) – OCHA fully supports the development of common IASC and ISDR messages on climate change where appropriate. The key message text below was developed by the IASC subgroup on communications in March 2009. It expresses in clear, media-friendly language, the agreed joint IASC and ISDR policy positions outlined in the official submissions to the UNFCCC negotiation process (the full submission texts are available on both the IASC and UNFCCC websites).

It should also be noted that while the campaign focuses on the need for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and preparedness, another major concern with climate change is the threat of increased internal displacement, which is the topic of another OCHA strategic campaign. In the course of 2009, these two campaigns will be linked more closely together.

OCHA Key Messages - Poznan version December 2008 (in Annex Three) – These are essentially the original key messages developed for the Poznan UNFCCC conference in early December. See www.ochaonline.un.org/ climatechange for the more succinct online version. While these are focused on the need for improved DRR and preparedness (which remains a core concern for OCHA), you should be aware that future messaging should increasingly reflect the broader IASC position, the need for disaster risk reduction AND preparedness for an effective response (in an effort to not be overly compartmentalized in our 'call to action'), as well as the growing concerns related to the risk of increased displacement.

Broader Talking Points March 10 2009 (In Annex

Four) – Based on earlier material developed for the Poznan Conference in December, these revised talking points are a more comprehensive reflection of the challenge of climate change for humanitarian action. Note that the OCHA call for action fits within a broader list of solutions for the future. This version has the most recent data, including relatively new data on the increase in reported disasters from the recent report by Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, which was commissioned by OCHA. USG John Holmes Speech to the UK Parliament 18 March 2009 (In Annex Five) – While this speech has been tailored to a specific parliamentary audience, it also offers a comprehensive account of our humanitar- ian concerns relating to the effects of climate change and resonates closely with campaign messages

ANNEX 2: IASC key messages

With the advent of increasingly extreme weather, climate change is affecting us all. But many living on the frontline of climate disasters are particularly vulnerable - due to poverty, insecurity or eco-system decline - and face a desperate future without greater effort from the international community to support them.

With warnings of more extreme climate events to come, growing competition for food, water and natural resources, declining health for many vulnerable populations, and the prospect of large-scale voluntary migration or forced displacement, the world has to rethink how it can adapt to the humanitarian challenge of climate change.

Although straining to meet the need for disaster aid, the humanitarian community does have the expertise, systems, funding mechanisms, and partnerships to help the world manage these disaster risks.

The good news is that many of the humanitarian consequences can be averted or reduced. But this means a system-wide adaptation with sustained investments in disaster risk reduction and preparedness, both at a global and local level, to lessen the social and economic shocks of extreme climate events.

ANNEX 3: OCHA key messages - Poznan version

The threat of climate change

The IPCC maintain that climate change already appears to be modifying patterns of extreme weather. Destructive heavy precipitation events, intense tropical storms, prolonged droughts and greater unpredictability are likely to increase as a result of climate change.

■ The number of recorded disasters, where the impact of a natural hazard event overwhelmed local coping capacity, has doubled from approximately 200 to over 400 per year over the past two decades. While some of this growth can be attributed to better reporting¹, it is estimated that seven out of ten disasters recorded are now climate related.



Growing vulnerability

• Over the next twenty years, the intensity, frequency duration and extent of weather related hazards will increase in many parts of the world. There are unlikely to be significant changes in the location of these hazards – in other words, we can expect more and intense climatic hazards in the areas where they occur today².

■ Humanitarian disasters occur as a result of people's exposure to hazards and their degree of vulnerability. Particularly vulnerable are those communities located where the risk of flooding, cyclones and drought is high and where their ability to cope with the hazard is especially low. These communities – such as those in the Zambezi flood plain or Bangladesh coastline – have suffered repeated climatic shocks, which has depleted their resources and made them reliant on external assistance.

■ The World Bank reports that over 97 percent of disaster deaths occur in developing countries, and that these deaths can be directly correlated to poverty levels³. The poor are less likely to be prepared or adequately equipped to cope with the impact of intense climatic events. Living in disaster-prone areas, they often have inadequate shelter, few assets or resources, few options for alternative income and little or no recourse to social welfare or insurance.

In particular, climate change threatens to exacerbate conditions for communities already made vulnerable by other factors – such as prevalent HIV/AIDS, poverty, insecurity, environmental degradation and unplanned settlements.

A need to 'ACT SOONER AND SMARTER'

The effect of climate change is already straining disaster response and broader humanitarian action. With the threat of extreme climatic events in the future, the demands for disaster assistance can be expected to rise, as can the costs involved⁴.

In response, the international humanitarian system must adapt quickly to the challenge, or risk the negative effects of repeated disasters overwhelming local coping capacities in at-risk areas, many of which may be in impoverished or crisis-affected countries.

Addressing climate change demands a multi-faceted international response with particular attention to curbing greenhouse gas emissions (as per the UNFCCC Copenhagen initiative) and adapting to climate change; with a greater investment in disaster risk reduction, risk transfers (public and private sector insurance initiatives) and preparedness.

• One way to counter extreme weather events is to "act sooner and act smarter" by shifting focus to concentrate on reducing vulnerabilities and improving preparedness measures. There is a global consensus that this is needed, as indicated by the signing of the Hyogo Declaration in 2005, where 168 Governments acknowledged that working to reduce disaster risks, especially at the community level, was essential.

For humanitarians, a priority is the need to ensure a better response in sudden-onset disasters. This means investing in better preparedness, especially in hazard hotspots.

Some countries, such as Mozambique and Bangladesh, provide excellent examples of how well-implemented disaster preparedness measures can significantly reduce the impact of climate hazards in risk-prone areas. These lessons need to be adapted and tailored to other similar, hazard-prone countries. Mozambique is the first example used in this campaign.

Call to Action

■ Tackling the threat of climate change in risk-prone areas will need a system-wide shift in our attention – in the shape of more funds, resources and expertise – to strengthen disaster risk reduction and preparedness for an effective response.

ANNEX 4: Broader talking points (March 10, 2009)

Climate Change is here

Climate change is not some distant future threat. It's happening today and millions of people are suffering the consequences. From the devastating floods that swept over swathes of sub-Saharan Africa and China last year, to heat waves in southeastern Europe, wildfires in California or Australia, and prolonged droughts in the Horn and Southern Africa, what we have witnessed is not an anomaly. This is a glimpse of a future that we must adapt to as a global community.

Climate-related disasters are on the rise, and threaten to wreak havoc in all countries, both rich and poor. While we are all affected by climate change, it is the developing nations – those least able to cope with its adverse effects – which are likely to suffer most.

Even if no single event can be reliably attributed to global warning, the trends as cited by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are clear and accelerating. The number of reported disasters has increased from an annual average of 90 in the 1970s to nearly 450 per year this decade⁵.



Natural disasters affected on average more than 250 million people per year in the past decade⁶. The number of people affected has increased steadily by an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 since the early 1970s⁷.

Seven out of every ten disasters recorded are now climate related⁸. Of the 27 humanitarian Flash Appeals that have been issued by the UN system since January 2006, 19 have been in response to floods and cyclones⁹.

The humanitarian perspective

There is a human face to climate change. As humanitarians working on the frontlines of disasters, we see the devastating effects of increasing and increasingly intense floods, storms, droughts and heat waves on vulnerable communities.

In these risk-prone parts of the world, climate disasters can wreak havoc on communities weakened by poverty, insecurity, poor health or environmental degradation.

The IPCC warn that extreme climate events will raise the risk of humanitarian emergencies and of population movements, as people choose to migrate, or are forced to displace elsewhere.

Humanitarians could face a staggering challenge in the coming years, with nearly 634 million people – one tenth of the world's population – living in at-risk coastal areas, and 2 billion people living in arid regions expected to become severely water stressed.

Any credible vision of the future must conclude that humanitarian needs will significantly rise and that climate change is the main driver.

The humanitarian community does have the established systems, mechanisms and partnerships to work in these hazard-prone areas, but the effects of climate change are already straining our ability to respond, and there is a risk of repeated disaster events overwhelming our ability to cope in the future.

Solutions: countering climate change

Floods, storms and droughts need not be disasters. But our actions will be decisive in determining how much damage results from nature's destructive potential. Much of this loss and suffering can be avoided with good planning and coordination on risk reduction, disaster preparedness and response, adaptation and development involving actors from multiple disciplines. In particular, we need to 'act sooner and act smarter'. This means a greater investment – in terms of attention, resources and expertise – in strengthening our disaster risk reduction, disaster preparedness and response and recovery mechanisms, especially in at-risk countries. By investing in DRR and preparedness - our first line of defence against the impacts of climate change - we can dramatically reduce the amount required to respond to emergencies once they've occurred.

Our humanitarian system also needs to better understand the threat of climate related migration and displacement, and to ensure that we are equipped, with the right approaches, tools and capacity - to meet that challenge, whatever its scale and dimension.

All of this needs to be coordinated closely with adaptation and development strategies that must aim to prevent or lessen people's exposure to climate hazards over the long-term.

ANNEX 5: Speech by USG Sir John Holmes to the UK Parliament lunchtime event "The Humanitarian Implications of Climate Change" 18 March 2009

I am delighted to be with you today, early in what the United Nations Secretary General has described as "the year of climate change", as we move towards the crucial deadline at Copenhagen at the end of the year.

I think that it is particularly good that this event focuses on the humanitarian implications of climate change, which I fear are too often forgotten as we understandably focus on the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the question of how to adapt tends to be ignored. Climate change is not just an environmental question. What we have learned from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, and from our own experience on the ground, is that the impact of climate change is increasingly central to the global economic and security agenda.

As the effects become felt, we need to face up to the fact that climate change is becoming a major driver of humanitarian need, and disasters. It is also likely to become a huge factor in future forced displacement. The point is that climate change is not just a future threat. It is an actual danger to millions of people, including many of the most vulnerable groups in the world. And this is bound to get worse.

Climate change is already increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme natural hazard events, particularly floods, storms, and droughts. And where these hazard events are allowed to become disasters by our action or lack of it, over the past decade, on average they are costing more lives and displacing more people, year on year.

CHA

The number of disasters recorded each year has doubled from 200 twenty years ago to 400 in the past two decades. Better reporting may have something to do with this. But today three quarters of all disasters are now climate related, compared with half a decade ago. Another example: in 2008 the UN humanitarian system issued 10 flash appeals. Every one of these was in response to a disaster resulting from extreme weather. In 2007, 14 out of 15 flash appeals were from were extreme weather disasters. Now, while we can't attribute any specific event directly to climate change, last year, floods and storms affected more than 65 million people worldwide. That is equivalent to the entire population of the UK, or one percent of the world's population. In just one year.

All the scientific evidence suggests this trend will continue and accelerate, whatever happens in Copenhagen. The challenge of addressing climate change is further complicated by its interaction with other global trends, such population growth and urbanisation, which are increasing risks to vulnerable populations. It also means entry and exit strategies for humanitarian assistance are becoming less and less clear as creeping changes in water and food availability create more 'slow onset' crises.

Defining humanitarian action by reference to trigger events such as natural disasters or conflicts, as we have done for so long, is less and less relevant in comparison with chronic humanitarian need in areas where drought, flooding, and sea level rise become the norm. In other words, climate change threatens to overwhelm the current capacity of the humanitarian system to respond effectively and to impose new models of prevention, preparedness and response. I will come back to this in a moment.

But it is much more than this. Climate change is also redrawing the world maps of population, wealth and resources and changing where and how people are able to live their lives. Sea level rise, the increasing climate- related disasters, and the more insidious impacts on water availability and agricultural production are already making some places uninhabitable

Let me give you just three examples: For many small island states, sea level rise means that people's lives and homes are increasingly vulnerable to the high tides and storm surges that go with them. Water supplies and agricultural production are threatened by changes in rainfall patterns and the intrusion of salt water. Kiribati in the Pacific is following in the steps of the Mal- dives by preparing already for relocation for its people on a permanent basis as the rising sea level threatens to submerge it. The permanent re-location of 2,500 inhabit- ants of the Carteret and Mortlock Islands of Papua New Guinea is already underway. My second example, in Bangladesh, sea level rise of half a metre over the last 100 years has already eroded hundreds of square kilometres of land from islands in the Ganges delta. Now studies suggest that the number of people displaced by this process is in the order of tens of thousands a year. If we get further significant rises in the sea level, which the scientists tell us are virtually inevitable, the entire coastal area will be inundated, resulting in massive human displacement – tens of millions of people, not tens of thousands, as well as billions of dollars of losses in GDP, and huge reductions in livelihood possibilities for those people that stay.

Third, in the Horn of Africa, the ongoing and increasing drought is putting huge pressure on the key resources of water and pasture. The lives and livelihoods of pastoralist communities are increasingly vulnerable and fragile. On present trends, the area of Eastern Africa affected by drought is expected to double by the end of this century. Periods of drought are expected to increase in length, making recovery more difficult. One effect of this is that people will move.

And although the effects of climate change can be felt by everyone in the world, it is inevitably the poorest and most vulnerable communities who will be worse off. Quite simply, they have the least resources to adapt and in many cases may be the least informed about what is happening to them.

In some African countries, for example, agricultural production fed by rainfall- and virtually all of it is- is projected to halve by 2020, with the most populated regions of the Sahel and Southern Africa among the worst affected. 93 percent of farmed land in sub-Saharan Africa is rain fed. In Nigeria, 1,350 square miles of land turns to desert each year and all of the resulting disruption is uprooting farmers and herdsman and causing internal migration towards coastal areas. The same process is happening across West Africa.

In the world's rapidly growing cities and the so called mega-cities, , many of which are near the coast in flood prone areas with uncontrolled urban growth, the poorest communities are living in the most vulnerable and flood-prone – areas. That means the risks of living in mega- disasters are growing with these burgeoning populations.

Climate change is increasing stress on marine fish stocks to the detriment of subsistence and small-scale fishing communities, never mind the large scale producers.

Reduced agricultural productivity will automatically result in reduced food availability and increase food insecurity, especially in the context of higher demand for food and food price volatility, which led to last year's



food crisis. And its is important to remind ourselves that the fundamentals of that crisis have not gone away, even if the media has shifted its attention to the economic and financial crisis, away from food.

The underlying issue here is that continuing global population growth means that we have to increase food production by at least 50% by 2050, just to keep pace with the extra mouths, never mind the demand for better diets. How are we going to do this, with the supply of arable land and water is unlikely to grow, and indeed much more likely to shrink under the impact of climate change?

It is the availability of water which is the key variable. Two point four billion people in South Asia are predicted to be living in regions of high water-stress in the next fifty years. South Asia currently supports a quarter of the world population, with just one twentieth of the world's annual renewable water resources. About half a billion people – half of the world's poor – eke out a living using local land and water resources.

And reflect on this possibility: By 2035, there is a high chance that, under the influence of climate change, the glaciers that feed the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra will have disappeared altogether. The flow of those rivers will become seasonal, bringing massive changes in the capacity of the land to support such an enormous population.

The net result could be human displacement on an almost unimaginable scale. And flows of migrants on such a scale will quickly overwhelm the capacity of state authorities, and the international community, to respond, which is why people speak of the threat of climate change to global stability and security. The impact of changes in water availability, food security, the prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and mass movement of people is bound to aggravate existing tensions and generate new conflicts.

Even without climate change, as the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, the potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify in the coming decades is very high. Add climate change, and the resulting deprivation and displacement found will act as a multiplier and extra trigger for such conflict.

Fortunately, mankind is good at adapting to new situations as it has done throughout history. The bad news is that these developments may happen at an unprecedented and unanticipated speed. Unless we act comprehensively and quickly, they will overwhelm us, and the first to suffer will be the poorest and most vulnerable, who have done the least to bring them about. That is a crude diagnosis. So what do we need to do?

First of all, of course, we do need a strong, binding global agreement in Copenhagen that can start to stop runaway climate change. This is not a luxury, but an absolute necessity to save the planet. Concerns over the global economy must not derail governments from tackling the longer-term existential crisis of global warming.

But the focus on mitigation must not lead us to neglect the necessary adaptation to the effects of climate change, which, as I hope I have made clear, are, and will be impacting on our world, however successful the negotiators may be in Copenhagen.

For this crucial task of adaptation, I see three particular challenges from a specifically humanitarian perspective.

Firstly, we need to reduce and manage risk coming from extreme weather events. Secondly, we need to ensure that the successor to the Kyoto Protocol strengthens existing systems for disaster reduction and management, rather than undermining them. Thirdly, we need to overcome the traditional divide between the humanitarian and development communities, and develop what we may call a new business model for tackling these issues. Let me take these in turn.

Reducing risk and managing extreme events: Here the good news is that the Bali Action Plan, correctly recognised that disaster risk reduction, risk management and risk transfer strategies are crucially important components of adaptation to climate change.

Disaster risk reduction and risk management are our first line of defence against the impacts of climate change. They will be particularly important in the short term, to avoid massive increases in humanitarian need which we are unable to deal with while we build capacity to implement longer term adaptation strategies.

In our favour, we already have an internationally agreed agenda for reducing disaster risks and disaster losses called the Hyogo Framework for Action, agreed in 2005. It provides clear ways of integrating risk considerations into sustainable development, mechanisms and capacities at all levels in order to build systematic resilience to extreme weather events. But while progress has been made, the magnitude of resources available for disaster risk reduction falls well short of what is required.

But even meeting our commitments under the Hyogo Framework will not be enough because of the new challenges arising from climate change, particularly those relating to displacement and migration.

OCHA

We also need to look at new ways to share risk. In low income countries, only 4 percent of weather-related losses are currently covered by some kind of insurance. We need to keep on working together to investigate and develop innovative mechanisms for protecting people through collective kind of protection systems such as catastrophe pools, microfinance, social funds and micro-insurance.

The second challenge we face is to ensure that a new global climate change agreement strengthens, rather than compromises, existing systems and mechanisms. We do have established institutional mechanisms and frameworks, at national, regional and international levels.

We have the HFA, we have the cluster approach, which has enhanced system-wide preparedness and capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies. We also have funding mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund, which provides more timely and predictable funding for humanitarian assistance, and much improved partnership between UN other partners such as NGOs. These are the basis for the kind of fast-track action we need.

And we must make sure environmental negotiators and disaster managers – mitigators and adapters, if I can put it that way – are not operating in separate silos, nationally or internationally, but are working closely together at all levels. Copenhagen has to get adaptation, as well as mitigation, right.

The third challenge is to ensure that we can transcend the traditional divide between humanitarian and development action. On the humanitarian side, we have to make sure not only that we are prepared and able to come to the aid of those stuck by extreme weather events, but we also can play a major role in helping to reduce the vulnerability of communities to future disasters.

On the development side, strategies for poverty alleviation and have to incorporate concrete actions to reduce the vulnerability of the poorest people and improve their capacity to adapt to climate change. This means incorporating activities that reduce disaster risks and help communities cope with the longer term impacts of climate change, and their effect on water availability and agriculture.

If we only respond to individual events, disasters will progressively erode the livelihoods of the poor. It will leave them more vulnerable and widen the gap between those who can afford to reduce their disaster risk, and those who cannot. That would not be sensible or acceptable.

We therefore need a new strategic dialogue to reduce the current institutional divisions between relief and development action and funding. We also need a new business model on the humanitarian side, that focuses more on prevention and preparedness, and building capacity to do that so we can do less on the international response side. We will need a new business model that can deliver more international and national capacity, and which moves away from the idea that the internal community will ride across the horizon after an event.

Examples such as that of DfID and IFRC putting aside a percentage of their response funding- up to 20%- to support risk reduction will need to be much more widely followed. We also will need new kinds of action, and to draw on the talents and resources of the private sector.

We also need to start looking intensively into how we handle forced displacement and migration resulting from climate change, whether within countries or across international borders. In other words, what legal and institutional frameworks do we need to deal with this massive future challenge, which is not really covered by existing refugee conventions or by UNHCR? I don't have all the answers but we need to work them out before this out before these tragedies hit us with their full force.

To sum up...

We are already seeing the impacts of climate change on humanitarian caseloads. Increasing floods, storms and droughts are killing and displacing more people year on year. It threatens to overwhelm the capacity of the humanitarian system to respond to them.

But adaptation to climate change is not only a challenge for the humanitarian community, but for the whole international community. Unless we act immediately and with total commitment, it will derail development and social progress and threaten global security. Those that suffer most as a result will be the poorest and most vulnerable.

It is imperative that a strong agreement is reached in Copenhagen. It is imperative that that agreement uses humanitarian expertise and strengthens existing mechanisms for risk reduction, risk management and risk transfer globally. And it is imperative that we find new ways of sharing risk, and working together across the humanitarian-development divide.

If those that are most vulnerable are forced to struggle alone in the face of climate change, any Copenhagen agreement will fail. It will fail because it will be unjust and inequitable; and because if climate change is allowed to become a source of global instability and strife, mitigation promises will be forgotten.

The stakes are high and the time is short.

We have to start now.



ANNEX SIX: TOR for Sub-group on Communications (February 2009), IASC Informal Task Force on Climate Change

Further to the IASC Task Force on Climate Change meeting in Geneva on 14 January, it was agreed that a communications sub-group be set up to develop clear messaging on the humanitarian implications of climate change aimed at the media and State Parties to the UNFCCC in the period leading to the final COP15 in December 2009. A coherent and collaborative communications approach was considered essential if the humanitarian implications of climate change, the need for adaptation measures, and humanitarian and development solutions were to be adequately reflected in the COP15 process. Particular efforts should be made early in 2009 to ensure that humanitarian concerns are taken into consideration by State Parties attending the UNFCCC negotiation meetings in Bonn (April & June) and in Bangkok (28 September to 9 October), where much of the preparatory negotiation and drafting will take place, ahead of the final meeting in Copenhagen in December.

Participants: IASC communications focal points (and tasked with climate change issue)

Aim: The purpose of the sub-group is to provide a forum for discussion and planning to maximize the impact of IASC and individual agency messaging on the humanitarian implications of climate change in the lead up to COP15. Particular aims are to i) better communicate the IASC position to inform the UNFCCC negotiation process and ii) conduct sustained media outreach to highlight the humanitarian consequences of climate change and need for a successful outcome at Copenhagen.

Specific objectives are to:

draft a clear, simple and strong message that reflects our collective position (building on the unified messaging that was agreed upon for the Poznan conference)
 facilitate an efficient information exchange that provides all participants access to IASC partner communications activities and plans

I identify and seize opportunities for collaboration between IASC members, such as: cross-linking websites, reinforcing online communications strategies, undertaking joint or complementary media outreach; supporting side events at forthcoming UNFCCC negotiation meetings

serve as a forum for sharing ideas on how best to communicate, with innovation and effectiveness, the joint humanitarian concerns to media and other target audiences
 serve as a forum for gathering and sharing the best avail-

able data and country examples to ensure messaging by IASC members is as complete, coherent and accurate as possible

Workings:

OCHA (Communications & Information Services Branch) will lead the sub-group.

Participation in the sub-group is intended for media or communications focal points in each of the respective agencies. A communications contact list will be drawn up of those who wish to participate in the sub-group.

Invitations and an agenda will be sent out one week in advance for comments, as well as other details on bridgelines and NY/Geneva timings.

■ Sub-group teleconferences will be scheduled a couple of days after the Task Force meetings and will normally take place at 10am New York time / 4pm Geneva time. Initially, teleconferences will be conducted weekly, switching to twice monthly by mid-March and then possibly monthly thereafter, depending on requirements.

The sub-group lead will report back to the IASC Task Force on progress made. A summary and action points of the teleconference will also be distributed to all agency focal points and to the IASC Task Force on Climate Change.

The need for the sub-group will be reviewed after the Copenhagen conference.

FOOTNOTES TO ANNEXES

 Increases in relief and reconstruction assistance have encouraged international reporting of more disasters (IFRC 2005).

2. Idem

3. World Bank 2004, An Adaptation Mosaic (Mathur, Burton and van Aalst eds.)

4. In 2007, the humanitarian community spent US\$700 million, or about 10 percent of the official humanitarian assistance budget, in response to 'natural hazard disasters'. UNDP estimates this figure will need to increase to US\$2 billion per year by 2015.

5, 6, 7. The Humanitarian Costs of Climate Change, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University December 2008

8. Based on recorded disasters reported to CRED in last two decades.

9. OCHA Financial Tracking System.

Contact: Mark Dalton Visual Media Unit


daltonm@un.org ochavmu@un.org

CHA

ANNEX SEVEN: Supporting graphs


Drought events






Flood events

NUMBER PER YEAR




Storms

NUMBER PER YEAR




Extreme temperature

NUMBER PER YEAR




Mass movement wet (e.g. landslides)

NUMBER PER YEAR



Wildfires

NUMBER PER YEAR




Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be - Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium



Global natural disasters

NUMBER OF DISASTERS BY TYPE



Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be - Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium